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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
By 
Sarah Andrea Jacobson 
May, 2010 
Committee Chair: Dr. Ragan Petrie 
Major Department: Economics 
The chapters of this dissertation explore complementary areas of applied 
microeconomics, within the fields of experimental and environmental economics.  In 
each case, preferences and institutions interact in ways that enhance or subvert efficiency. 
The first chapter, ―The Girl Scout Cookie Phenomenon,‖ uses a laboratory 
experiment to study favor trading in a public goods setting.  The ability to practice 
targeted reciprocity increases contributions by 14%, which corresponds directly to 
increased efficiency.  Subjects discriminate by rewarding group members who have been 
generous and withholding rewards from ungenerous group members.  At least some 
reciprocal behavior is rooted in other-regarding preferences.  When someone is outside 
the ―circle of reciprocity,‖ he gives less to the public good than in other settings.  We find 
no evidence of indirect reciprocity.  We find two behavioral types in each treatment, 
differing in baseline giving but not in tendency to reciprocate. 
The second chapter, ―The Effects of Conservation Reserve Program Participation 
on Later Land Use,‖ studies another public goods issue: conservation. The Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers to retire farmland.  We use a treatment effect 
framework to find that ex-CRP land is 21-28% more likely to be farmed than comparable 
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non-CRP land.  This implies that the CRP improves low-quality land, making it more 
attractive to farm.  This could demonstrate inefficiency, since farmers gain private benefit 
from a program meant to provide a public good.  On the other hand, farmed ex-CRP land 
is more likely to adopt conservation practices, although this may not be caused by CRP 
participation. 
The third chapter, ―Learning from Mistakes,‖ examines financial decisions by 
adult Rwandans in institutions inside and outside the lab.  Over 50% of subjects make 
irrational choices over risk—choices that likely do not reflect their preferences, and are 
therefore likely inefficient—and these subjects share tendencies in their take-up of 
financial instruments.  Risk-averse individuals are more likely to belong to a savings 
group and less likely to take out an informal loan.  For those who make mistakes, 
however, as they become more risk averse, they are less likely to belong to a savings 
group and more likely to take up informal credit. 
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Chapter I: The Girl Scout Cookie Phenomenon 
Peer Pressure in Grassroots Fundraising 
 
Introduction 
 
People seem to have a natural tendency to engage in reciprocal behavior.  Their 
motives, however, are often ambiguous: the same actions can be explained by other-
regarding preferences or by strategic motives.  The distinction is important, because in 
many settings selfish motives alone cannot sustain cooperative behavior.  The existence 
of other-regarding preferences has been documented in isolated laboratory experiments, 
but self-interest may dominate in richer field settings.  Can institutions leverage other-
regarding preferences while still harnessing the strategic motives of selfish people to 
promote pro-social behavior?  One institution that may serve this purpose is grassroots 
fundraising.  We report the results from a laboratory experiment that mimics elements of 
this institution to study the power of favor trading to support a public good.  The design 
of our treatments ―subtracts away‖ the possibility of each of a number of behavioral 
motives so that we can cleanly isolate the effects of direct and indirect reciprocity.  We 
find evidence of direct reciprocity (rooted in other-regarding preferences), but a notable 
lack of indirect reciprocity. 
Our methods and results are best understood through analogy to grassroots 
fundraising.  Many nonprofit organizations fundraise by enlisting citizen boosters to 
solicit donations from their social networks.  Such a fundraiser makes direct, personal 
solicitations to people with whom he has an ongoing relationship.  Donations are revealed 
to the fundraiser and often to everyone else who is solicited.  A classic example is the 
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Girl Scouts of the USA, an organization that works with American girls.  The Girl 
Scouts’ most prominent fundraiser is the annual drive in which member girls and their 
families sell cookies to friends, family, and neighbors.  Klein (1990) argues that social 
favor trading played a role in the funding of turnpikes in early America.  The same 
dynamic may occur when it is not money but time and effort being solicited, as may 
happen in a volunteer advisory board or a school’s parent-teacher association. 
This fundraising technique is so common that social networks are sometimes full 
of people with ―pet causes‖ for which they are fundraising.  Imagine that Joe and Frank 
work in an office together.  Joe’s son is in Boy Scouts, and Frank’s daughter is in Girl 
Scouts.  Each child’s organization has an annual fundraiser: Joe’s Boy Scout sells 
popcorn in January, and Frank’s Girl Scout sells cookies in February.  Each has a special 
interest in his child’s fundraiser, because of the family’s stake in the organization’s 
success.  As a result, Joe will buy popcorn and Frank will buy cookies, but in addition, 
Joe wants Frank to buy popcorn, and Frank wants Joe to buy cookies.  Even if Frank is 
not interested in the Boy Scouts (or the popcorn), Frank may buy Joe’s popcorn in 
January, hoping that Joe will reciprocate when Frank’s cookie fundraiser comes around 
the next month.  These peers use the promise of future reciprocation—in a favor trading 
exchange like many that arise in social situations—to pressure each other to perform the 
pro-social act of giving to charity. 
We study whether and to what extent favor trading can increase pro-social 
behavior, and we look at the motives behind this behavior.  Our research questions are as 
follows.  Does the opportunity to practice targeted reciprocity increase contributions to a 
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public good?  Is giving in this setting driven by direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, or 
only strategic self-interest?  Is there important heterogeneity in behavior? 
These questions, and the efficacy of the favor trading public goods institution in 
general, are difficult to study in non-experimental settings because selective use of 
fundraising techniques can cause endogeneity problems in the analysis.  For example, 
Long (1976) found that the more ―personal‖ a donor solicitation, the more contributions 
were solicited, and inferred that the reason was that a more personal solicitation allowed 
the fundraiser to exert peer pressure on the donor.  However, this analysis is biased in 
favor of finding a relationship: personal solicitations are more costly to perform, so 
charities may limit their most personal solicitations to a ―hot list‖ of likely donors. 
This study fits into the literature examining social influences on cooperative 
behavior.  We focus on the roles of immediate self-interest, altruism, strategic self-
interest, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity.  Conditional cooperation, a general 
form of reciprocal behavior, may influence giving in public goods games as surveyed in 
Gächter (2007); this will be a background force in all of our treatments.  While 
immediate self-interest and altruism are well-known concepts, the other motives require 
explanation.  See Sobel (2005) for a review of the literature on interdependent 
preferences and reciprocity, including a helpful comparison of the terminology from 
various models.  We use the phrase ―strategic self-interest‖ to describe Sobel’s 
―instrumental reciprocity,‖ in which apparently reciprocal actions are undertaken to win 
future rewards (i.e. purely for selfish reasons).  One characteristic of strategic self-interest 
is that, since strategic motivations depend on future rewards, the removal of those future 
rewards will destroy strategically-motivated cooperation.  As a result, if actors are 
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strategically-motivated, finitely-repeated games that depend on cooperation tend to 
unravel from the end period.  Strategic cooperation could look like unconditional 
cooperation, but it could also be conditional: a wise strategic person should ―bribe‖ only 
people who have shown a tendency to reciprocate. 
In contrast to strategic cooperation, we use the terms ―direct reciprocity‖ and 
―indirect reciprocity‖ to describe conditional urges rooted in other-regarding preferences 
(Sobel’s ―intrinsic reciprocity‖).  Important models of this kind of reciprocity include 
Rabin (1993) and Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008).  Most models of this type allow 
Joe’s preferences over Frank’s payoffs to depend on Frank’s past actions.  Because these 
kinds of reciprocity are rooted in other-regarding preferences, they can sustain 
cooperation even in cases where strategic cooperation would unravel.  Biologists (e.g., 
Trivers 1971) have recognized the potential for reciprocity in general to promote pro-
social behavior and to help pass on positive traits. 
In the case of direct reciprocity, the reciprocator responds to acts that directly 
affected him.  For example, if Joe is a direct reciprocator, he may reward Frank for 
Frank’s past behavior toward Joe.  Direct reciprocity is difficult to distinguish from 
strategic cooperation except that it implies continued reciprocation during end periods.  
Other researchers have examined direct reciprocity using one-shot games, often with 
some form of an investment game (e.g., Cox 2004).  In our setting, we find direct 
reciprocity in the final periods of a repeated game. 
Indirect reciprocity occurs when a disinterested third party rewards good 
behavior.  For example, imagine that coworker Rita has no interest in Girl or Boy Scouts 
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and has no pet cause of her own.  If Rita rewards Frank for patronizing Joe’s charity, 
she’s exhibiting indirect reciprocity.  Some (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund 2005) argue that 
indirect reciprocity could be a powerful tool for boosting cooperation in a large, diffuse 
group. 
We test for indirect reciprocity by exogenously assigning one subject to a position 
from which he can differentially reward others but he himself can never be rewarded.  In 
this way, he benefits very little from establishing a norm of cooperation in his group.  
This is a strict test of indirect reciprocity.  Other studies (for example, Engelmann and 
Fischbacher 2009; Seinen and Schram 2006) have found indirect reciprocity by having 
subjects play one-shot cooperation games in pairs, randomly re-matching them, and 
reporting to each subject’s new partner a statistic (e.g., an ―image score‖) that reflects this 
subject’s past generosity.  This definition of indirect reciprocity is less strict than our 
definition, in that it allows indirect reciprocators to benefit from a norm of cooperation in 
the group. 
While laboratory experiments provide clean, controlled tests, critics have argued 
that other-regarding preferences inferred from such tests are artifacts of laboratory 
methods and have no relevance for behavior outside the lab.  Dictator games and 
investment games, often used to study altruism and reciprocity, have received particular 
criticism.  Some of this criticism focuses on the results of field experiments that imply 
that strategic (reputation) concerns are more important than other-regarding preferences.  
For example, List (2006) found that ―gift exchange‖ behavior by sports card traders is 
only seen when there is an incentive to maintain a reputation, and Soetevent (2005) found 
that open church collection baskets (allowing churchgoers to see each others’ donations) 
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increase donations.  As discussed in Falk and Heckman (2009), incentivized behavior 
observed in the lab is just as ―real‖ as behavior observed in field settings, and context-
specificity is just as much of a problem for field results as it is for lab results.  We take 
the view that apparent conflicts between lab and field findings simply show that social 
forces must be studied in a variety of controlled settings to learn in what ways they are 
sensitive to institutional features. 
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways.  First, our ―Stakeholder‖ 
public goods game integrates a vehicle for targeted reciprocity into the public goods 
setting, to emulate the favor trading that occurs in social networks.
1
  The design allows us 
to isolate reciprocal behavior and test for other-regarding preferences.  Second, we 
include a ―Bachelor‖ design as a clean test for indirect reciprocity.  Third, using a within-
subject design, we observe shifts in behavior across institutions and use an endogenous 
type classification method to study heterogeneity and sensitivity to institutions. 
We find that average contributions increase by 14% when targeted reciprocal acts 
are possible.  We confirm that reciprocal behavior is the cause for this increase, and that 
this is rooted (at least in part) in other-regarding preferences.  Using our strict, clean test, 
we do not find evidence of indirect reciprocity.  We find meaningful heterogeneity in 
giving behavior, and we find some stability in behavior across treatments.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section describes the three experimental 
treatments.  In the following section, we present results. In the final section, we conclude.  
                                                     
1
 The citizen booster as public good stakeholder is one lens through which to view asymmetric returns in a 
public goods game; others (e.g., Brandts, Cooper, and Fatas 2007) have examined the role of such a person 
as a potential leader. 
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Experimental Design 
 
The experiment is a linear public goods game, with publicly revealed 
contributions and asymmetric payoffs.  Subjects are assigned to five-person groups for a 
number of rounds.  In each round, each person has an endowment of z tokens to allocate 
between a private investment with return a to himself and a public investment with some 
return to all group members. In each round, one group member is the Stakeholder: he has 
a bigger stake in the public good, in that he gets a higher return (relative to other 
members) from tokens invested there.  The Stakeholder position rotates through group 
members.  The public good return is b for non-Stakeholders and c for Stakeholders.  
Person i’s contribution to the public good in round t is git, and Staket is the index of the 
person who is Stakeholder in round t.  Payoffs are: 
 
 
jt it tj
it
jt it tj
c g a z g if Stake i
b g a z g if Stake i

    
  
    


 
The parameters are such that b < a < c and a < 4b + c, so the social optimum is 
achieved if everyone contributes fully.  Since (c – a) is positive, the Stakeholder 
maximizes profit by contributing as much as possible, so even a selfish Stakeholder 
always contributes to the public good.  Since (b – a) is negative, non-Stakeholders face a 
dilemma: they maximize profit by keeping all of their tokens, but this free riding is anti-
social.  Non-Stakeholder contributions will be the focus of our analysis. 
We use ui(m, y1, y2, y3, y4) to represent utility for subject i in any given round from 
his earnings in this round m and the earnings of the other four members of his group y1, 
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y2, y3, y4 in this round.  Designate the current Stakeholder as person k (and since non-
Stakeholder contributions are of greatest interest, k≠i).   
We borrow a nonparametric model of reciprocity from Cox, Friedman, and 
Sadiraj (2008) to describe reciprocal preferences.  Specifically, we note that i's marginal 
rate of substitution between his own payoff and that of another subject yj may depend on 
j’s past generosity toward i.  If subject j was generous in the past, then i may have a lower 
marginal rate of substitution (a higher willingness to pay) and thus be willing to sacrifice 
his own payoff to increase j’s.  That is, as a non-Stakeholder he may sacrifice high 
earnings from the private investment so that he can (through a public good contribution) 
increase the earnings of a subject j who has previously increased i's earnings. 
In any given round, a non-Stakeholder’s (i's) contributions increase the payoff of 
the other three non-Stakeholders (j≠i,k) and also the Stakeholder (k).  Thus i's public good 
contributions may be intended to increase the payoffs of any subject (y1, y2, y3, y4).  
However, for each token contributed, the Stakeholder benefits by c and the non-
Stakeholders only benefit by b (recall b < a < c).  Similarly, his contributions may be a 
reaction to past contributions to the public good from any round.  However, his earnings 
are increased most by contributions made when he was Stakeholder.  Therefore, he is 
most likely to respond to generosity that occurred when he was Stakeholder. 
A selfish person places no weight on others’ payoffs y1, y2, y3, y4, regardless of the 
other subjects’ previous generosity.  An unconditional altruist has a constant willingness 
to pay to increase others’ payoffs, and has the same willingness to pay for all four group 
members.  A reciprocator has a willingness to pay for each other subjects’ payoffs that 
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depends on that other subject’s past generosity.  (A person who is ―practically selfish‖ for 
the purposes of this experiment is one whose willingness to pay to increase others’ 
payoffs never increases above the opportunity cost of a public good contribution.  A 
―practically selfish‖ person may be a mild altruist, a mild reciprocator, or a reciprocator 
who encounters only low contributors.) 
Beliefs are important in determining the actions of strategic actors.  If a subject is 
selfish and believes that everyone else is either selfish or an unconditional altruist, he will 
not contribute.  If he is selfish but strategic, however, he may believe that he can 
influence his group members to have a greater willingness to pay for his benefit.  That is, 
if he believes his group members are reciprocators, he may believe he can win future 
earnings (particularly in rounds when he will be Stakeholder) by contributing to the 
public good this period.  Note that this future potential benefit becomes quite small once 
a subject has no future Stakeholder stints.  Thus, a strategic but selfish person may 
cooperate in early rounds but cease to do so after he passes his last Stakeholder stint.  His 
early-round cooperation may target people he expects to be reciprocators (no benefit can 
be gained from sacrificing for an unconditional altruist or a selfish person), and he may 
learn these types by observing other subjects’ past behavior.  As a result, this early-round 
strategic cooperation may depend on history in much the same way that reciprocal 
altruism may.
2
 
We report three treatments: Private, Public, and Ineligible, all described in detail 
below.  All three use endowment z = 20 tokens, private good return a = $0.02, non-
                                                     
2
 History could also affect current behavior through contagion: a person treated well (badly) in the past 
could react by behaving well (badly) not because they wish to reciprocate but because they have ―caught‖ a 
good (bad) mood from their experience.  This is outside of our model. 
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Stakeholder public good return b = $0.01, and Stakeholder public good return c = $0.03.  
For non-Stakeholders, the ―price of giving‖ is 2, while for Stakeholders it is 2/3.  All 
subjects participated in all three treatments, in a different group for each treatment, with 
treatment order varied across sessions. 
The experiment is computerized and proceeds as follows.  Subjects enter the lab 
and are given general instructions.  (All instructions are in Appendix A.)  They are told 
that they will play three sets of rounds with three different groups.  The first treatment 
begins, with a set of specific instructions that explain the information conditions and the 
number of rounds for this treatment.  The subjects play through all of the rounds for that 
treatment.  When the first treatment is over, the groups are reshuffled.  The second and 
third treatments proceed in much the same way, each with treatment-specific instructions.  
After all three treatments are complete, a questionnaire is administered and the subjects 
are paid anonymously.  Subjects’ total earnings are the sum of their earnings in each 
treatment, which in turn are the sum of earnings in each round.   
In the software for all three treatments, subjects see first a decision screen and 
then a review screen for each round.  In both the decision and review screens, the central 
feature is the contribution table.  This table contains a row for each round in the 
treatment.  Columns contain information on the subject’s contribution and the 
contributions of others in his group, the group’s total contributions, and the subject’s own 
earnings.  Information is filled into this table after the decision stage of each round, and 
remains visible for the rest of the treatment. 
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The Public treatment, which lasts ten rounds, follows the basic favor-trading 
public goods design outlined above. The Stakeholder position rotates through all five 
group members so everyone is Stakeholder twice.  Contributions are publicly revealed 
and tracked individually, and Stakeholder assignments are common knowledge.  Figure 1 
shows the decision screen of the Public treatment.  Each group member is randomly 
assigned a letter code (A, B, C, D, or E) and keeps the same letter code for all ten rounds.  
The contribution table shows in which rounds each subject will be the Stakeholder.  Since 
contribution history is public and everyone knows when each group member will be 
Stakeholder, subjects can reward each other for past generosity.  For example, if Joe is 
subject A and Frank is subject B, Joe can see how much Frank contributed in Round 1 
when Joe was the Stakeholder (when he raised funds for the Boy Scouts).  Joe can reward 
Frank with a large contribution when Frank is Stakeholder in Round 2 (when Frank 
fundraises for the Girl Scouts), or Joe may withhold that reward if he deems Frank’s 
donation stingy. 
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Figure 1. Public Treatment Decision Screen 
 
The Private treatment also lasts for ten rounds.  The Stakeholder position still 
rotates through all group members so that everyone is Stakeholder twice.  However, the 
information environment differs from the Public treatment.  Each subject still sees the 
disaggregated (individual) contributions of his group members, but subjects are not 
assigned letter codes.  It is no longer possible to track subjects’ reputations.  Figure 2 
shows the review screen of the Private treatment.  In each round’s row, the contribution 
table reports the contributions of all group members in a randomly-ordered list, re-
shuffled for each round.  Further, even if a subject believes he can identify a group 
member as being particularly worthy (or unworthy) of reward, he still does not know 
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when that person will be Stakeholder.  He only knows when he himself will be the 
Stakeholder, so he can’t target reciprocal acts toward any other particular subject. The 
Private treatment is a good baseline against which to compare Public treatment behavior 
because, as Sell and Wilson (1991) show, reporting disaggregated instead of mean or 
total contributions in a public goods game may increase contributions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Private Treatment Review Screen 
 
Finally, the Ineligible treatment is very much like the Public treatment, with 
randomly-assigned letter codes (not linked to the Public treatment letter codes), public 
reputations, and public Stakeholder timing.  However, one subject in each five-member 
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group (the ―Bachelor‖) is ineligible to be the Stakeholder.  To return to our guiding 
analogy, the ―Bachelor‖ is Rita, Joe and Frank’s officemate who does not have a pet 
cause for which to fundraise.  Because only four subjects are eligible to be Stakeholder, 
the Ineligible treatment lasts eight rounds, so each eligible subject is still Stakeholder 
twice.  The Bachelor is randomly chosen and remains the Bachelor for the entire 
treatment.  The computer screens for the Ineligible treatment (Figure 3) are like those for 
the Public treatment, except that the Bachelor is indicated in the screen header and in the 
contribution table as the ―Ineligible‖ person.  The Stakeholder position rotation skips the 
Bachelor: if person D is the Bachelor, the Stakeholder is A, then B, then C, then E, etc.  
 
 
Figure 3. Ineligible Treatment Review Screen 
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The difference between the Public and Private treatments is that direct reciprocity, 
indirect reciprocity, and strategic self-interest cannot motivate giving in the Private 
treatment, because subjects don’t have the information they would need to respond to 
each others’ actions.  (Unconditional altruism and conditional cooperation—response to 
overall group behavior—can affect giving in both treatments; actions targeted directly at 
another individual are only possible in the Public treatment.)  In the Public treatment, all 
of these forces are in play because reputations and Stakeholder identities are public.  Any 
difference between the Public and Private treatments must be due to direct reciprocity, 
indirect reciprocity, and/or strategic giving.   
Within the Public treatment, we will be able to see whether subjects are 
responsive to past generosity: that is, whether they discriminate by giving larger 
contributions when the current Stakeholder is someone who was previously generous.  In 
any given round, subjects may respond to the past behavior of both the current 
Stakeholder and the current non-Stakeholders.  However, if we detect this kind of 
responsiveness with regard to the current Stakeholder’s past actions, this is sufficient 
demonstrate reciprocal giving.  We can identify direct reciprocity as responsiveness of 
this type that does not disappear as the end period approaches. 
The Ineligible treatment allows us to investigate two additional questions.  First, 
the Bachelor herself (Rita, in our analogy) is not subject to direct reciprocity or strategic 
self-interest.  If the Bachelor does give in a way that responds to the Stakeholder’s past 
generosity, this would be evidence of indirect reciprocity.  Second, the presence of a 
Bachelor shrinks the ―neighborhood of reciprocity‖ from five people to four people. This 
leaves the Bachelor to reap benefits from other subjects’ increased generosity even if she 
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herself does not contribute.  We can observe whether this change in the group dynamic 
affects non-Bachelor contributions. For example, others may be discouraged by 
supporting a Bachelor who freeloads off the public good. 
The experiments were run in the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) at 
Georgia State University in six separate 20-subject sessions, for a total of 120 subjects. 
The software was written in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The protocol was double 
anonymous (subject decisions were anonymous even from the perspective of the 
experimenter).  Of the 120 subjects, 75 (62.5%) were female and the average age was 
21.8.  The experiment lasted about 90 minutes, and subjects earned on average $24.33 
(standard deviation $2.67). 
 
Results 
 
As described above, each subject participated in all three treatments.  The three 
treatments were run in all six possible orders.  We do not observe order effects, so we 
pool the data across sessions.  Contribution data are shown in Figure 4.  Stakeholder 
contributions (the dashed lines) are close to the endowment, which is expected because 
the Stakeholder’s return from the public good is greater than his return from the private 
good.
3
   Non-Stakeholder contributions (the solid lines) for each treatment are lower but 
significantly positive in all rounds.  These contributions show the downward trend 
usually seen in public goods games.  Bachelor contributions in the Ineligible treatment do 
not show this trend, but they are well below contributions in the other treatments. 
                                                     
3
 We can reject the hypothesis that contributions are strictly 100% (t-test p-value 0.000 for the Public, 
0.002 for the Private, and  0.000 for the Ineligible treatment).  This could be explained by subject error, 
since error can only be made in the negative direction, or myopic inequity aversion. 
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Figure 4. Contributions by Treatment and Role across Rounds (in Percent of Endowment) 
 
Non-Stakeholder contributions in the Private treatment are comparable to 
contributions in other linear public goods games in the literature with similar (symmetric) 
―prices of giving.‖   This was not a foregone conclusion, because the presence of a 
Stakeholder changes the non-Stakeholders’ incentives as compared to the incentives in a 
symmetric public goods game.  The Private treatment non-Stakeholder contributions start 
at 41% in round 1 and end at 21% in round 10, averaging 33% across all rounds.  In the 
final round, 47% of non-Stakeholders make positive contributions.  In Castillo and Petrie 
(2010), contributions decline from 41.6% to 23.6%, averaging 32.8%; Andreoni (1988) 
saw an overall average of 33.2%; Croson (1996) saw an overall average of 35.7%; 
relevant surveyed results in Cox and Sadiraj (2007) show positive contributions in the 
final period from 27-44% of subjects.  Results from asymmetric-return public goods 
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games are hard to compare because of differences in the payoff structure, but subjects 
with lower marginal per capita returns in somewhat similar treatments gave 20% on 
average in Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) and 18% in Glöckner et al. (2009).  Our game 
has some similarities to sequential-play public goods games, and although contributions 
are hard to compare because of differences in game structure, a similar sequential game 
(Güth et al. 2007) finds average contributions of 47.68% of endowment. 
 
Treatment Effects
4
 
 
The difference between the Private and Public treatments is that the Public 
treatment opens the door to targeted direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and strategic 
self-interest.  Thus, we can answer our first research question (whether these forces can 
increase the provision of a public good) simply by determining whether non-Stakeholder 
contributions are higher in the Public treatment than they are in the Private treatment. 
Figure 4 shows that average non-Stakeholder contributions in the Public treatment 
exceed those in the Private treatment in all rounds. These differences are only statistically 
significant in a few rounds, but are significant when pooled across rounds.  Table 1 
shows average Stakeholder and non-Stakeholder contributions for each treatment.      
  
                                                     
4
 Results that follow are mostly based on non-parametric tests; for the results of some selected parametric 
tests, including various regressions, see Appendix B.  All results hold for these parametric specifications. 
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Table 1. Average Contributions by Treatment and Role (Percent of Endowment) 
 Non-Stakeholder Stakeholder 
Private Treatment 33.02 
(25.98) 
N=120 
96.98 
(10.30) 
N=120 
Public Treatment 37.75 
(25.93) 
N=120 
95.63 
(10.36) 
N=120 
Ineligible Treatment, Non-Bachelors 35.96 
(22.26) 
N=96 
94.95 
(11.74) 
N=96 
Ineligible Treatment, Bachelors 23.39 
(28.41) 
N=24 
N/A 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
As shown in Table 1, the average non-Stakeholder contribution is 14.4% larger in 
the Public (37.75% of endowment) than in the Private treatment (33.02 %).  This 
difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.051).  Thus, these 
social forces increase cooperation by a modest but economically significant amount. 
 
Table 2. Average Contributions by Treatment and Bachelor Status (Percent of 
Endowment) 
 Non-Bachelor Bachelor 
Private Treatment 33.80 
(25.83) 
N=96 
29.90 
(26.89) 
N=24 
Public Treatment 37.79 
(24.86) 
N=96 
37.60 
(28.41) 
N=24 
Ineligible Treatment, Non-Bachelors 35.96 
(22.26) 
N=96 
N/A 
Ineligible Treatment, Bachelors N/A 23.39 
(28.41) 
N=24 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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As shown in Table 2, Bachelors in the Ineligible treatment contribute significantly 
less (23.39% of endowment) than they did in the Private (29.90%) or Public (37.60%) 
treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.043 and p=0.020, respectively).  We cannot 
precisely identify the reason that Bachelors give less than they gave as Non-Stakeholders 
in the Private treatment.  However, we conjecture that Bachelors feel a weakened urge to 
conform to the norm of contribution since they cannot be Stakeholder, or that their 
reduced earnings potential causes Bachelors to be less willing to trade off their payoff to 
benefit others (because of an income effect or spite).  There is no difference between non-
Stakeholders’ behavior in the Ineligible treatment (35.96% of endowment) and their 
behavior in the Private (33.80%) and Public (37.79%) treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test p=0.233 and p=0.410, respectively).  Thus, though the game has changed from the 
perspective of non-Bachelors (shrinking the ―circle of reciprocity‖ to four people, and 
adding a public good beneficiary who is outside that circle), the effect of these changes is 
indeterminate and small. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of non-Stakeholder contributions, pooled across 
all rounds of all sessions.  All treatments show a peak at zero tokens, a possible peak at 6-
10 tokens, a dip between 10 and 20, and a peak at 20 tokens (full endowment).  While 
qualitative differences appear between the treatments, many of these are not statistically 
significant.  However, Bachelors give zero tokens more often in the Ineligible than in the 
Private (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.007) and the Public (p=0.014) treatments.  Also, 
in the Public treatment, subjects give 20 tokens more often than in the Private (p=0.021) 
and Ineligible (p=0.098 for Bachelors, p=0.041 for non-Bachelors) treatments. 
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Bins: 0; 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-19; 20. 
Figure 5. Distribution of Non-Stakeholder Contribution Amounts, Pooled across Rounds 
 
Direct Reciprocity and Other-Regarding Preferences 
 
We wish to detect reciprocity, i.e. responsiveness to the current Stakeholder’s past 
behavior.  To do this, we use nonparametric within-subject tests of aggregate statistics.   
For each person, we want to see whether (as non-Stakeholder) he gave more to the public 
good in rounds in which the current Stakeholder was previously generous to him, as 
compared to rounds in which the current Stakeholder was previously ungenerous.  
Stakeholder past generosity is determined by the current Stakeholder’s average 
contribution to the public good in rounds wherein this subject was the Stakeholder.  For 
example, Joe is Stakeholder in rounds 1 and 6, and Frank is Stakeholder in rounds 2 and 
7.  In round 2, Joe will remember how generous Frank was in round 1: ―Stakeholder past 
generosity‖ will be Frank’s contribution in round 1.  In round 7, when Frank is 
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Stakeholder, our measure of ―Stakeholder past generosity‖ for Joe would be the average 
of Frank’s contributions in rounds 1 and 6 (when Joe was Stakeholder). 
We define a ―generosity threshold‖ such that contributions greater than this 
amount are considered generous.  For each subject, we calculate his average contribution 
when facing a Stakeholder whose ―past generosity‖ measure meets this threshold, and his 
average contribution when facing a Stakeholder whose past generosity does not.  We 
tried many thresholds, including the ―endogenous threshold‖ of the group’s cumulative 
average contribution, and results were robust.  We report results from a threshold of 10 
tokens (50% of endowment).  To see how this works, imagine that a group contains only 
Joe, Frank, and Mary.  Frank gave 15 tokens every time Joe was Stakeholder, and Mary 
always gave 2 tokens.  Joe’s average contribution to a generous Stakeholder is his 
average contribution when Frank was Stakeholder, and his average contribution to an 
ungenerous Stakeholder is his average contribution when Mary was Stakeholder. 
A subject displays reciprocal behavior if he gives more when facing a previously-
generous Stakeholder than when facing a previously-ungenerous Stakeholder.  Table 3 
presents averages of these measures.  In the Private treatment, the two statistics are not 
significantly different.  This is expected (and reassuring) since in that treatment subjects 
can’t tell who is Stakeholder or what the current Stakeholder did in the past.  In both the 
Public and Ineligible treatments, subjects give significantly more—over 50% more—to 
previously-generous Stakeholders than they give to previously-ungenerous Stakeholders.
5
  
We use a difference-in-difference test to compare responsiveness (the difference between 
                                                     
5
 Recall that subjects could respond to past actions of the current Stakeholder and the current non-
Stakeholders, although their contributions benefit the former three times as much as the latter.  If subjects 
were responding to non-Stakeholders in this way, this would attenuate our within-subject test of 
responsiveness to Stakeholder history. 
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the amount given to a generous Stakeholder and the amount given to an ungenerous 
Stakeholder) between treatments.  Responsiveness is greater in both the Public (14.83% 
of endowment) and Ineligible (17.3% of endowment) treatments than in the Private         
(-1.59% of endowment) treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.000 and p=0.000, 
respectively).  This is evidence of directly reciprocal behavior.  Responsiveness does not 
differ between the Public and Ineligible treatments (p=0.966). 
 
Table 3. Average Non-Stakeholder Contributions across All Rounds by Stakeholder's 
Past Generosity toward Subject (in Percent of Endowment) 
 
 
 
Private 
Treatment 
 
Public 
Treatment 
Ineligible 
Treatment  
(excl. Bachelors) 
Stakeholder gave ≥ 10 on average in past 
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder 
27.57 
(26.62) 
41.92 
(32.06) 
41.22 
(29.11) 
Stakeholder gave < 10 on average in past 
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder 
29.16 
(29.59) 
27.09 
(27.63) 
23.92 
(24.08) 
N 82 95 75 
P-value (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 0.773 0.000 0.000 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
N’s are less than 120 because some subjects did not face both a generous and an ungenerous stakeholder. 
For this reason, we dropped 38 of 120 subjects in Private, 25 of 120 in Public, and 21 of 96 subjects in 
Ineligible. 
 
Do subjects discriminate because of other-regarding preferences or because they 
are strategic?  We can dispose of strategic concerns by looking for reciprocal giving after 
a person has passed his last Stakeholder stint.  For example, again assume that Joe was 
Stakeholder in rounds 1 and 6, and Frank was Stakeholder in rounds 2 and 7, and assume 
that no further fundraising rounds follow.  If Frank was kind to Joe in rounds 1 and 6, 
will Joe reciprocate in round 7?  If he is purely strategic, Joe has very little to gain, so he 
should not contribute and therefore not reciprocate.  
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We test for reciprocal behavior rooted in other-regarding preferences by 
constructing statistics of each subject’s average contribution to previously generous and 
ungenerous Stakeholders in rounds after this subject’s last Stakeholder stint.  These 
results, shown in Table 4, imply that other-regarding preferences play a role.  Subjects in 
the Public treatment continue to discriminate between generous Stakeholders (to whom 
they give 30% of endowment) and ungenerous Stakeholders (16.93%) even after they 
have no strategic motive to do so.  In the Ineligible treatment, the sample size is greatly 
reduced because fewer subjects can be considered (only non-Bachelors) and the treatment 
is shorter (eight rather than ten rounds).  Because of this reduced power, discrimination in 
the late rounds of the Ineligible treatment is not statistically significant, although the 
point estimate is positive (26.60% is given to generous Stakeholders, and only 19.30% is 
given to ungenerous Stakeholders). 
 
Table 4. Average Non-Stakeholder Contributions by Stakeholder’s Past Generosity 
toward Subject, after Last Stakeholder Stint (in Percent of Endowment) 
 
 
 
Private 
Treatment 
 
Public 
Treatment 
Ineligible 
Treatment  
(excl. Bachelors) 
Stakeholder gave ≥ 10 on average in past 
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder 
14.60 
(25.70) 
30.00 
(30.99) 
26.60 
(31.98) 
Stakeholder gave < 10 on average in past 
rounds in which subject was Stakeholder 
18.60 
(29.24) 
16.93 
(27.43) 
19.30 
(27.75) 
N 31 41 25 
P-value (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 0.436 0.026 0.435 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
N’s are less than 120 because 48 subjects had to be dropped from each treatment because there were less 
than two rounds remaining after their last Stakeholder stint; additionally, more subjects had to be dropped 
from each treatment (41 of 120 from Private, 31 of 120 from Public, and 23 of 96 from Ineligible) if they 
did not face both a generous and an ungenerous Stakeholder after their last Stakeholder stint. 
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Indirect Reciprocity 
 
An indirect reciprocator is a disinterested party who rewards one subject for 
generosity toward another subject.  A strict definition of indirect reciprocity cannot be 
tested by looking at the responsiveness of a subject who has the opportunity to be 
Stakeholder, because he is not disinterested:  he can benefit from a norm of cooperation.  
Our clean test for indirect reciprocity is the behavior of Bachelors in the Ineligible 
treatment.  These randomly-selected subjects will never be Stakeholder, so they can never 
receive the benefits of targeted reciprocity.  Therefore, direct reciprocity and strategic 
self-interest are not strong motives for Bachelors. 
We have shown that Bachelors give significantly less than non-Stakeholders in 
the Ineligible treatment and less than they themselves gave in the other treatments.  The 
people who are Bachelors show evidence of reciprocity in the Public treatment (i.e. they 
have positive ―responsiveness,‖ as defined previously; results available on request), so 
they do behave reciprocally when they are part of the circle of reciprocity.  However, 
Bachelors in the Ineligible treatment do not give more (Wilcoxon signed-rank p=0.823) 
when facing previously generous Stakeholders (when they give 21.91% of endowment on 
average) than when facing previously ungenerous Stakeholders (25.54% of endowment).  
Therefore, indirect reciprocity does not seem to be a motivator in this setting. 
This result is particularly intriguing, given that other studies have found indirect 
reciprocity.  However, the re-matching structure of those experiments allows subjects to 
have an interest in the group’s overall cooperation.  Therefore, subjects in those 
experiments are not wholly disinterested, as our Bachelors are.  Both conditions are valid 
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settings in which to examine cooperation; however, we feel that our result hews more 
closely to the ―bystander‖ interpretation of indirect reciprocity.  
 
Heterogeneity in the Population 
 
In estimating population effects, we may be missing important heterogeneity in 
individual behavior.  Our within-subjects implementation allows us to characterize each 
subject within a treatment and see how subjects change their behavior between 
treatments.  We use an endogenous classification method to characterize subjects by their 
baseline giving and their responsiveness to other subjects’ past behavior.  This method 
(based on the "estimation / classification" method of El-Gamal and Grether 1995) 
specifies a finite mixture model that mixes several instances of the same model and then 
uses maximum likelihood to simultaneously assign subjects to types and choose the 
parameters (coefficients) for each type.  This allows the data to generate the ―rules‖ that 
best describe the data.  A standard finite mixture model generates population percentages 
for each of the nested models.  To summarize the data, we assign each subject to the type 
that best describes his contributions; that is, for each subject, we round to 1 the 
probability of the type that best represents him, and round the rest down to 0.  
We index types by m, and model contributions as a function of a history variable 
hikt (subject k’s past contributions when person i was Stakeholder as of period t) and other 
variables Xit.  The model uses type-specific parameters, including a constant parameter 
am which represents baseline tendency to give (altruism), and a ―responsiveness‖ 
parameter bm.  The empirical model for each type is: 
   it m m ikt m it itg a b h C X  
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This analysis is similar to Bardsley and Moffatt (2007).  However, their game is 
different (as it is a sequential public goods game using a ―Conditional Information 
Lottery‖ to determine payments).  Also, while they specify four types (a free-rider type, 
an altruist type, a reciprocator type, and a strategic type) and then estimate each type’s 
parameters and mixing probabilities using maximum likelihood, we specify a number of 
types but do not restrict parameters of any of the types (e.g., a=b=0 for an free-rider). 
We performed this analysis with two, three, and four types.  In the results we 
report, Xit includes only the group cumulative average contribution (excluding the 
subject’s own past contributions and the current Stakeholder’s past contributions). 
Results were robust to the inclusion of round number and a dummy indicating whether 
the subject had passed his last Stakeholder stint.  Results were also robust to the inclusion 
of subject demographics (gender and age), but as none were significant we do not report 
those results. 
For simplicity, Table 5 presents results from the two-type analysis.  In each 
treatment, Type 1 is large (comprising 61-73% of the population) and has a small a1 (low 
altruism), whereas Type 2 has a large a2 (high altruism, a2 > a1).  Thus, we will call Type 
1 ―low type‖ and Type 2 ―high type.‖  The bm parameter (responsiveness) is large, 
significant, and positive for both types in both the Public and Ineligible treatments.
6
  
Within each treatment, the types show similar responsiveness (b1 ≈ b2, t-test p-value 
greater than 0.13 in all cases).  That is, while the types differ in altruism, all types tend to 
                                                     
6
 As the table shows, the responsiveness coefficient is also significant (but very small) in the Private 
treatment, though in this treatment it is not possible to target reciprocal behavior at individuals.  This 
spurious significance comes from the dynamic entanglement inherent in panel analysis of this kind of data.  
Responsiveness is much higher in the Public and the Ineligible treatments as compared to the Private 
treatment (t-test p-value=0.000 and 0.001, respectively). 
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reciprocate.  This universal responsiveness holds as more types are added.  Thus, the 
most important heterogeneity is in the baseline tendency to give and not in the tendency 
to reciprocate. 
 
Table 5. Behavioral Types from Estimation / Classification Procedure 
  Private 
Treatment 
Public 
Treatment 
Ineligible 
Treatment 
 Number (percent) in type 1 76 (63%) 73 (61%) 70 (73%) 
 Number (percent) in type 2 44 (37%) 47 (39%) 26 (27%) 
T
y
p
e 
1
 
Constant 8.34*** 
(2.60) 
-3.91 
(3.34) 
8.51** 
(3.71) 
Stakeholder past contributions to 
me 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.33*** 
(0.04) 
0.30*** 
(0.05) 
Group cumulative non-
Stakeholder contributions 
(excluding me) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.37*** 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
T
y
p
e 
2
 
Constant 38.72*** 
(4.29) 
23.96*** 
(4.25) 
50.07*** 
(8.22) 
Stakeholder past contributions to 
me 
-0.01 
(0.078) 
0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
Group cumulative non-
Stakeholder contributions 
(excluding me) 
0.32*** 
(0.10) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
-0.27* 
(0.07) 
 # of observations 720 720 432 
 Log likelihood -3389.976 -3411.576 -1612.1664 
 AIC 6791.952 6835.152 3236.3328 
 BIC 6808.677 6851.877 3251.719 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Normal distribution for error; mean is linear function of covariates. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
For comparison, Bardsley and Moffatt (2007) find approximately 39% of subjects 
to be strategists, 25% to be free-riders, 30% to be reciprocators, and 6% to be altruists.  A 
striking similarity between their results and ours is that neither they nor we find 
significant evidence of unconditional altruism. 
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How do subjects change across treatments?  There is imperfect stability in types: 
56% of subjects are the same type for all treatments, and most of these (42% of the 
population) are consistently low type.  Subjects who are high type in one treatment give 
significantly more in the other treatments.
7
  Type transitions are shown in Table 5.  The 
low type is ―stickier‖ in a loose sense: for each treatment, subjects that are low type in 
that treatment are very likely (78-85%) to be low type in the other treatments, while high-
type subjects are less likely (32-56%) to become low type. 
 
Table 6. Treatment-to-Treatment Type Transitions: Percent of Subjects Making Each 
Transition 
 
Low to Low Low to High High to Low High to High 
From Private 
To Public 49% 14% 12% 25% 
From Private 
To Ineligible 54% 9% 19% 18% 
From Public 
To Ineligible 50% 9% 23% 18% 
Transitions to and from Ineligible treatment types use only 96 subjects, since Bachelors are excluded. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Favor trading is a natural element of social networks.  Grassroots fundraising 
harnesses people’s tendency to trade favors and uses that reciprocal drive to increase the 
provision of public goods.  Using an experimental design that allows different forms of 
reciprocity to be turned on and off, we explore the power of favor trading and the 
mechanisms through which this institution may work. 
                                                     
7
 Results available on request. For example, Private-high type subjects give more in the Public treatment 
than do Private-low type subjects (55.61% of endowment as compared to 27.41%, Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
p=0.000). 
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We demonstrate reciprocal giving rooted in other-regarding preferences, i.e. direct 
reciprocity.  While some studies have robustly shown direct reciprocity in laboratory 
institutions like the investment game, others have criticized the abstraction and isolation 
of those institutions.  The presence of direct reciprocity in our slightly richer setting may 
be the next step in building a bridge toward non-laboratory institutions that encourage the 
expression of direct reciprocity. 
It is remarkable that in our strict, clean test, we do not find indirect reciprocity.  
Our definition of indirect reciprocity may be too strict, in a sense.  While most 
experiments seeking indirect reciprocity allow actors to benefit from an increased 
tendency to cooperate within the group, we strip our Bachelor of incentives to foster 
cooperative norms.  It is also notable that in our setting, Bachelors can never earn as 
much as other subjects.  It is possible that this inequity causes some feeling of 
disaffection on the part of the Bachelors, and this suppresses the expression of their social 
preferences.  This accords with the low level of contributions by Bachelors, and also with 
the remarkably flat profile of Bachelor contributions across the rounds of the treatment.  
Whatever the explanation, our results imply that indirect reciprocity is sensitive to 
institutional factors.  The institutional factors essential to our test of indirect reciprocity—
the disinterestedness of the indirect reciprocator and the potential for inequity—are 
factors that could certainly be present in many evolutionary settings, so the absence of 
indirect reciprocity in our results is quite interesting. 
In our experimental setting, favor trading increases cooperation by 14.4%, an 
amount that is both statistically and economically significant.  This should provide a 
lower bound for the level of efficiency that this kind of institution might achieve.  In a 
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true social situation, rewards and sanctions are much stronger motivators than the 
incentives offered in the lab, and social interactions can be an extremely long-term game.  
These results support our intuition about the effectiveness of grassroots solicitation as a 
fundraising tool, and suggest that favor trading could be successfully leveraged in other 
settings as well.  Our results also show the robustness of direct reciprocity, and the 
fragility of indirect reciprocity, to small changes in the institution. 
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Chapter II: The Effects of Conservation Reserve Program Participation on Later 
Land Use 
 
Introduction 
 
The United States Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers to retire 
land from agriculture.  The program has several goals, including the preservation of 
environmental assets and the long-term improvement of the country’s agricultural 
productivity.  Balancing multiple goals is always difficult, and may be especially 
challenging with regard to the long-term effects of such a program.  In the case of the 
CRP, the disposition of land that leaves the program deserves study because the program 
is extremely large and market and political factors can trigger policies that suddenly 
release quantities of CRP land.  For example, the 2008 Farm Bill dictated a drop in the 
CRP’s enrollment cap from 39.2 million acres to 32 million acres.  If land that leaves the 
CRP persists in conservation, this long-term effect boosts the program’s environmental 
benefits.  If ex-CRP land returns to farming at a high rate, however, this works against 
the program’s environmental goals, but may indicate that the CRP made the land more 
productive. 
We examine land use of parcels that have been in the CRP to determine whether 
the CRP has an effect on the land’s later use.  We ask whether CRP participation causes 
land to be more or less likely to be farmed (or to take up another land use) and whether 
past CRP participation is correlated with the use of conservation practices on farmed 
land.  We focus on land that exited the CRP between 1992 and 1997, the first period in 
which land left the program in great quantity.  We use a treatment effect framework, with 
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regression and matching methods.  This approach makes an explicit comparison between 
land that has been in the CRP (―treated‖ parcels) and land that has not been in the 
program (―control‖ parcels), a comparison we must make to attribute causality to CRP 
participation.  
The CRP was established by the 1985 Food Security Act.  A CRP contract binds a 
landowner to abstain from farming the land for a period (10-15 years) and to plant a 
conservation cover for that period.  To join the program, farmers submit bids consisting 
of the rental payment they will accept, the land they would like to enroll, and the 
conservation cover they will plant.  The ―best‖ bids (according to criteria that evolved 
over time) are accepted.  The USDA reimburses farmers for some of the cost of planting 
conservation cover.  If a farmer exits before his contract expires, he pays a penalty. 
The program has been very popular.  Enrollment has usually been near its acreage 
cap (36.4 million to 39.2 million acres from 1992 to 2002), and competition has been 
keen for CRP contracts.  The first contracts expired in 1996.  Very few parcels left the 
program before that, and in 1996 (as in later years) most parcels with expiring contracts 
re-enrolled.  There is some variability in a parcel’s ability to exit or re-enroll in the 
program.  For example, around 1996, some holders of unexpired contracts were allowed 
to remove their land from the program without penalty, and some expiring contracts were 
automatically extended for one year if the contract-holder wanted to do so.  The CRP’s 
eligibility criteria and bidding system also changed over the years to improve incentive-
compatibility and to take into account an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI).  As a 
result, some early enrollment waves accepted land for contracts that, when expired, were 
not renewable because the land did not meet the CRP’s new criteria. 
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Post-CRP land disposition has been of interest for some time, but since CRP exits 
did not occur in quantity until the first contracts expired in 1996, studies before 1996 
were performed using surveys and simulations.  Researchers (for example, Cooper and 
Osborn 1998; Johnson, Misra, and Ervin 1997) surveyed farmers to gauge their intentions 
to remain in the program and their plans for the land if the CRP were eliminated.  These 
surveys give useful qualitative results; for example, they indicate that not all CRP land 
would be farmed if it were not in CRP and that market prices drive land use decisions. 
General equilibrium simulators estimate parameters or elasticities from observed 
land use and then use those estimates to predict the land use transitions that would occur 
under different market and policy conditions.  These simulations account for the effects 
of CRP entry and exit on agricultural supply and therefore on price, which can feed back 
into other parcels’ entry into and exit from agriculture.8  Using the POLYSYS simulator, 
De La Torre Ugarte et al. (1995) estimate that 57% of CRP land would be farmed if the 
CRP was terminated, and De La Torre Ugarte and Helliwinckel (2006) estimate that 37% 
of CRP land would be farmed if the CRP were gradually eliminated.  Secchi and Babcock 
(2007) use the EPIC simulator to show that crop prices have a very strong influence on 
the decision to un-retire CRP land.  Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins (2008) find that the 
CRP accounted for a reduction in cropland of 29 million acres between 1982-1997 (given 
32.8 million acres estimated enrolled in 1997, this implies that at least 88% of CRP land 
would have been farmed). 
While general equilibrium simulation is essential for market-level analyses, it 
may not be well-suited to the analysis of parcel-level transitions, as discussed in Roberts 
                                                     
8
 One such phenomenon is ―slippage,‖ as discussed in Wu (2000) and a series of related papers. 
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and Lubowski (2007).  General equilibrium simulators predict land use by assuming that 
land will enter its highest return use.  These models’ ability to predict in this context is 
limited by the fact that returns (and land characteristics determining those returns) are not 
fully observed.  Therefore, micro-level analyses of land use changes are a useful 
complement to general equilibrium simulations. 
One such analysis is Roberts and Lubowski (2007), who also examine post-CRP 
land use decisions.  They use post-CRP land use in 1997 to parameterize a model of land 
use for ex-CRP land, and perform a partial equilibrium simulation to predict that 58% of 
CRP land would enter farming if the program were eliminated.  Roberts and Lubowski 
use a Heckman two-stage model to control for selective exit from the CRP.  However, a 
remaining concern is selection in CRP enrollment: land that enters the program must be 
have low opportunity costs, i.e. low returns from farming. To assign causality to CRP 
participation, this selection must be considered so that CRP parcels are compared to 
parcels that are similar in quality—that is, to land that is also marginal and therefore 
likely to leave farming anyway. 
We compare ex-CRP parcels to parcels that have not been in the program to ask:  
did CRP participation cause changes in the later land use of enrolled parcels (compared to 
the use they would have entered had they not ever been in CRP)?  In contrast, Roberts 
and Lubowski ask: given a known function that determines post-CRP land use, what will 
happen to currently-enrolled CRP land if the program disappears?   
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  We attribute 
causality to CRP experience by using plausible counterfactual (non-CRP) land parcels.  
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Our methodology is innovative in the use of a sample specification step that trims the 
treatment (CRP) and control (non-CRP) groups to the most comparable units.  We also 
perform a multinomial logit analysis, which more thoroughly explores the land use 
decision.  Finally, we study adoption of conservation practices on land that exits CRP and 
is later farmed. 
We find that a naïve analysis, without careful specification of counterfactual land, 
shows that ex-CRP land is farmed at a lower rate than other parcels.  However, when 
compared with the best counterfactual group, ex-CRP land is 21-28% more likely to be 
farmed than non-CRP land.  Because this counterfactual group is very much like the ex-
CRP group, we can infer that the increase in cultivation is caused by CRP participation.  
This result is novel in the literature, but is not unexpected, since the land should have 
improved while in the program.  Thus, the CRP’s long-term effects comport with some of 
the program's goals (such as agricultural efficiency) while working against others 
(environmental protection).  We also show that cultivated ex-CRP land is more likely 
than similar land to adopt a conservation practice such as contour farming.  However, we 
cannot infer whether the conservation practice result is caused by CRP participation. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we discuss 
a model of land use choice.  Next, we describe the methods we will use to address the 
research questions.  In the following section, we introduce the data and provide summary 
information.  We give special attention to the potential ―treatment‖ (CRP) and ―control‖ 
(non-CRP) groups that will be used in the analysis.  We present results in the following 
section.  In the final section we conclude. 
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Theory 
 
The essential insight behind the analysis is that a land parcel’s use is determined 
by the relative returns of all possible uses for that parcel.  This model has its roots in the 
ideas of Ricardo and von Thünen: land enters the use that provides the highest quasi-
rents, and these quasi-rents depend on land quality and land location.  In this model, we 
may abstract away from landowner preferences, because idiosyncratic values are 
reflected in quasi-rents if markets are competitive and complete. 
We denote land use as a  A, where A is the set of all possible land uses.  We 
define p as the vector of input and output prices in the economy, x as the vector of land 
characteristics, and t as the vector of technology and policy factors.  Each parcel has a 
quasi-rent corresponding to each potential use in set A.  The quasi-rents are functions of 
p, x, and t: that is, landowner rents from use a are  (a | p, x, t).  Observed land use is: 
 * arg max | , ,
a A
a a

 p x t  
Some important points inform the analysis. First, we must be concerned with both 
observable and unobservable elements of the land characteristic vector x.  Land 
characteristics have static elements and elements that vary over time in ways that depend 
on the land’s history.  For example, soil can become more erodible as land is farmed.  
Notably, soil erodibility can improve as land is removed from agriculture and conserved, 
such as when it is planted with conservation cover, and CRP participation has been 
shown to improve land quality (e.g., Uri 2001).  Low soil quality (e.g., high erodibility) 
makes the land less productive to farm, so parcel-level quasi-rents also depend on 
interactions between land characteristics and market prices. 
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Land use transitions should occur when the quasi-rent from the current land use is 
less than the quasi-rent that could be earned from some alternative land use.  However, 
some parcels face transition costs when changing land use.  For example, parcels in CRP 
contracts face penalties if they exit the program before the contract has expired.  Even on 
contract expiration, land seeking to leave CRP and enter agriculture faces irreversible 
transition costs and uncertain future returns; these characteristics can delay or forestall 
transitions.  For land leaving CRP, transition costs back into agriculture are affected by 
the type of conservation cover planted for CRP.  Grasses are the most common cover (the 
others are forest and wildlife habitat) and carry the lowest transition cost.  Because of 
transition costs, changes observed over short periods (such as the transitions we 
investigate) should understate the long-term transitions that will occur. 
Transitions into the CRP are costly, but are subsidized by the government: the 
USDA reimburses some of the costs of planting conservation cover.  These transitions are 
not possible for all parcels because of CRP eligibility requirements.  As the CRP’s 
criteria changed to emphasize environmental benefits, some parcels in the program 
ceased to be eligible.  In these cases, if the contract-holder re-applied upon expiration of 
the contract, the application was rejected.  Thus, when a parcel leaves the CRP, it could 
be because the landowner prefers to put the land into another use (i.e. because the return 
to another use is now higher) or because it is no longer eligible to stay in the program.
9
 
When a parcel leaves the CRP voluntarily or is forced out, it should transition into 
the most profitable non-CRP land use.  CRP contracts are only granted to land that was 
                                                     
9
 Parcels that are potentially eligible with respect to land characteristics may be rejected if the bid was too 
high.  If the bidding mechanism is incentive-compatible, the bid reflects the parcel’s opportunity cost.  
Such a rejected bid would mean that the return to another use (the opportunity cost) now exceeds the return 
to CRP participation. 
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cultivated cropland at the time of application, so farming may be the next most profitable 
activity for much of this land.  However, as noted above, transition costs may delay or 
forestall desired transitions. Additionally, land characteristics and market conditions may 
have changed to make farming either more or less profitable for any given parcel. 
Many factors described above would have influenced land use decisions even 
without the CRP.  We seek to identify the change in land use decisions that occurs 
because of parcels’ experience in the CRP.  How can CRP tenure cause changes in post-
program land use?  The CRP experience could change landowner preferences for 
conservation to reduce the likelihood of farming.  Recall, however, that the model 
assumes that preferences are reflected in quasi-rents, so the model does not allow 
identification of such an effect.  Practically, however, these preferences could be 
imperfectly capitalized or not perfectly reflected in quasi-rent proxies.  On the other 
hand, land improvement while in the program increases the returns to farming, and this 
should increase the likelihood of farming.  Land that is retired from farming but does not 
enter CRP may also improve, but CRP’s subsidization of conservation practices and 
CRP’s enforced 10-year retirement should cause greater improvement.  Thus, theory is 
ambiguous as to what effect CRP participation should have on later land use. 
 
Methods 
 
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that it is impossible to observe 
any unit as both a treated unit and a counterfactual (non-treated) unit.  Here, end-of-
period (1997) land use is the outcome and CRP participation is the treatment.  To identify 
effects of CRP participation on land use, we must compare the land use outcomes of each 
CRP parcel to the outcomes that would have occurred had the parcel never entered CRP.  
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The fundamental problem of causal inference appears here in that we cannot know what 
would have happened to these CRP parcels had they not entered the program.  These 
parcels are different from non-CRP parcels because of selectivity in CRP entrance, and 
therefore a simple comparison to the land use outcome of non-CRP parcels could produce 
biased results.  We must choose non-CRP parcels that can act as good counterfactuals. 
Controlling for land characteristics, the returns to various land uses, and the 
interactions between these would yield unbiased results if the treatment and control 
groups are sufficiently similar.  For our first step, we perform a variety of ―naïve‖ 
analyses using a full data set.  We regress end period (1997) farming outcome on past 
CRP status, controlling for land characteristics, estimated returns to land uses, interaction 
terms, and region dummies, with appropriate spatial error clustering. 
If the parcels in the control (non-CRP) group are very unlike parcels in the 
treatment (CRP) group, regression results can be biased, as demonstrated in Rosenbaum 
(2002).  This is because treatment units are compared to inappropriate control units, and 
given the inevitable mis-specification of a linear model, differences in sample 
characteristics may drive apparent differences in outcomes.  To try to counteract this bias, 
we perform a matching analysis on the same data set.  The matching algorithm chooses 
the control (non-CRP) units that are ―most like‖ the treated (CRP) units based on 
observable characteristics.  All matching results reported in this paper use nearest 
neighbor matching, without calipers, using the Stata package psmatch2 (Leuven and 
Sianesi 2003).  A propensity score is estimated (as a function of land characteristics, rent 
proxies, and region dummies) to determine a given parcel’s likelihood of being in CRP.  
A Mahalanobis metric (a way of calculating the difference between points in a 
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multidimensional space) is used to do the matching, and this metric is calculated from the 
land characteristics, rent proxies, region dummies, and the propensity score.  We 
calculate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) based on the matched sample. 
Matching can only account for differences in observable characteristics.  If 
treatment and control groups differ in unobservable characteristics that are correlated 
with the outcome of interest, matching results may still be biased.  What unobservable 
characteristics are important in this analysis?  Land characteristics are imperfectly 
observed, and transition costs are difficult to estimate, but both are crucially important in 
the determination of land use outcomes.   
To address this, we perform an additional sample specification step.  We trim the 
samples of CRP and non-CRP data to include only the parcels that are most appropriate 
to compare, based on theory and program characteristics.  Conceptually, this is a 
population-level process much like the observation-level process of matching: the most 
comparable treatment and control group are selected based on observables to reduce bias.  
Comparability of the populations is difficult to ensure because of unobservable 
differences in the unobservable characteristics of land.  However, inferences about these 
land characteristics can be drawn from the land use into which the parcel’s owner has 
chosen to put it.  This sample specification step, therefore, is a selection process targeting 
the CRP and non-CRP parcels that are most comparable based on the characteristics that 
can be inferred from their patterns of land use.  The results comparing different 
subsamples used in the analysis in this paper can be thought of as ways of approaching 
the data with different research questions. 
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We specify two different treatment groups: CRP-Eligible and CRP-Exit.  CRP-
Eligible includes land that enrolled in the CRP in an early signup wave and was therefore 
probably eligible to exit by 1997.  (Publicly-available data do not identify contract end 
dates, so exit eligibility is not known and must be guessed.)  If the treatment group 
included land outside this group, many CRP parcels would be locked into contracts that 
are costly to exit, and the results would greatly understate the likelihood of transitions.  
However, much of the land that was eligible to exit actually stayed in the CRP, in part 
because of the automatic contract extension offered by the USDA in 1996.  If a parcel 
stayed in the program, CRP participation may have changed the use this land would have 
adopted had it left the program, but it did not increase any of those returns enough to 
drive the land out of the program, or at least not by 1996.  In this sense, it is not possible 
to fully observe the CRP’s effect on land use for any parcels that stayed in the program. 
We therefore create the group CRP-Exit, containing only parcels that actually 
exited.  CRP-Exit contains some parcels that choose to leave (perhaps because they could 
earn a greater return outside the program), and some that are forced out (including parcels 
that do not meet new CRP eligibility rules), but it is not possible to determine why any 
given parcel left the program.  Given the automatic contract extensions offered in 1996, it 
is likely that most CRP exits at this time were voluntary. 
Using CRP-Eligible as the treatment group asks the question, ―Given that staying 
in CRP is allowed, what land use is observed on land that has been in CRP?‖  Using 
CRP-Exit asks, ―Given land that has exited the CRP, what land use is observed?‖  This is 
a narrower question, because it is likely that the parcels that exit CRP are better-quality 
than the parcels that remain in the program.  Some parcels may have exited specifically 
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so that they can be farmed.  The results from an analysis that uses CRP-Exit are 
informative, but caution should be exercising when extrapolating to other CRP parcels. 
We also specify two different control (non-CRP) groups.  Control-All includes all 
land that was farmed in 1982, the start of our analysis period. This restriction is 
important, because only farmed land can enter the CRP.  Control-All includes productive 
farmland that is very unlike CRP land.  We can control for observable characteristics, but 
these may understate the differences between CRP and Control-All parcels. 
To address this difference in unobservables, we specify another non-CRP group 
called Control-Unfarmed.  Control-Unfarmed parcels were farmed in 1982, so share a 
history of cultivation with the CRP parcels, but were not farmed in 1992.  This ensures 
that non-CRP parcels face transition costs if they are to be cultivated, as CRP parcels do.  
It also restricts the sample to land of low enough quality that the landowner is willing to 
remove it from cultivation, which must also be true of CRP land.  That is, by his land use 
choice, the landowner of a Control-Unfarmed parcel has revealed that his parcel’s 
unobservable attributes are of low quality, just as the landowner of a CRP parcel has. 
There are a few sources of possible differences between Control-Unfarmed and 
CRP land.  First, Control-Unfarmed land may be of lower quality than ex-CRP land 
because Control-Unfarmed was willing to retire from farming without a subsidy, while 
some CRP land probably would not have retired without being paid.  This would make 
Control-Unfarmed less likely to be farmed later.  Second, and conversely, some Control-
Unfarmed land may be higher quality because it left farming but did not choose to enter 
CRP (we cannot identify which land applied to CRP and was rejected and which did not 
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apply).  These farmers may have wanted to keep the value of the option to farm during 
the coming ten years.  This would make Control-Unfarmed more likely to be farmed. 
Because of these factors, Control-Unfarmed land may be slightly better or slightly 
worse than CRP land.  We acknowledge this potential difference.  However, we expect 
that the resulting bias should be small, and we feel that Control-Unfarmed is still the best 
possible counterfactual group for CRP land. 
Additionally, factors related to the timing of transitions may bias the results of 
comparison between CRP land and Control-Unfarmed.  First, some Control-Unfarmed 
land may be in fallow cycles.  The data set we use tries to classify land in a fallow cycle 
as cultivated cropland.  Land classified as non-cultivated cropland (which is mostly hay) 
or pastureland is verified to have not been cultivated cropland for the last three years.  
However, if the fallow cycle is five years or longer, this land may be misclassified so that 
it ends up in the Control-Unfarmed category.  Parcels that exit CRP may begin farming 
immediately because they will have just emerged from a 10-year fallow period (their 
CRP tenure), but only some non-CRP parcels in long fallow cycles will be ready to farm.  
This may introduce a bias making Control-Unfarmed less likely to be farmed in 1997 as 
compared to ex-CRP land.  Second, and conversely, if transitions into farming take time 
our results may be biased to show Control-Unfarmed land more likely to be farmed.  This 
is because, whereas non-CRP land can transition into farming in any year, CRP land can 
only transition after contracts end in 1996.  Thus, ex-CRP land transitions may be under-
recorded relative to non-CRP land transitions, thus biasing our results toward zero. 
Using the pre-processed treatment and control groups, we perform the same 
regression and matching analyses described for the naïve sample.  Comparing transitions 
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into cultivated cropland among CRP-Exit parcels to those observed among Control-
Unfarmed parcels is akin to performing a difference-in-difference analysis.  It is the 
difference between CRP and non-CRP land in the difference in land use between the 
earlier period (1982) and the end period (1997).  Analyses on the broader data set, and on 
the other combinations of treatment and control groups, do not yield valid difference-in-
difference results because in those cases, the samples are not comparable. 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
 
CRP contract information is sensitive and therefore is not distributed at a level of 
detail that is useful for parcel-level analysis.  We use data from a large nationwide land 
survey to collect parcel-level characteristics, and we match those data with county-level 
estimates of the returns to various land uses. 
First, parcel-level data were obtained from the USDA’s National Resource 
Inventory (NRI; see US Department of Agriculture 2001).  The NRI is a panel survey of 
over 800,000 land parcel samples throughout the country.  It provides data for 1982, 
1987, 1992, and 1997.  The NRI is a stratified survey, and the analysis that follows takes 
into account the NRI’s sampling structure.  Data are not available for Alaska or the US 
Virgin Islands, and we exclude parcels in Hawai’i and Puerto Rico, since land use 
decisions in those areas are likely to be quite different from land use decisions in the 
forty-eight contiguous states.  Variables reflecting essential land quality data are not 
recorded for land that is urban, transportation, federal, or water.  As a result, we exclude 
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parcels that entered one of these land uses in 1997.  This exclusion is particularly 
acceptable because this land’s use may be idiosyncratic.10 
The NRI land quality data of interest for this analysis are slope, erodibility, land 
capability classification (defined in US Department of Agriculture 2009), and the prime 
farmland indicator (ibid.).  The NRI records land use in broad categories (e.g., cultivated 
cropland, non-cultivated cropland (which is mostly hay), pasture, and CRP) and narrower 
sub-categories.  Throughout this paper, cultivated cropland will be referred to as 
―farmed‖ land.  This use includes all close and row crops, and will be an outcome of 
particular interest because of farming’s environmental impact.  Parcel location 
information is available but limited in precision because the NRI data are designed to 
render precise sample location identification impossible. 
The second source of data is a set of county-level proxies for the returns to 
various land uses.  These data consist of 1996 rent levels and 1986-1996 changes in rent 
levels for various land use categories.  These rent data are described in the appendix of 
Roberts and Lubowski (2007).  These county-level proxies are only available for 1600 
counties, and the analysis considers only counties for which rent data are available.
11
 
Table 7 shows the characteristics of land in subpopulations of interest.  The first 
column shows all land that was farmed in 1982, and the second column shows all land 
that was in CRP in 1992.  As expected, CRP land is worse than the broader sample of 
originally-farmed land by all measures (less likely to be prime or have a good land 
classification, more erodible, and more sloped).  CRP land also tends to stay in CRP at a 
                                                     
10
 Results hold for specifications excluding land classification (the characteristic available for the fewest 
uses) from the control variable set and including the land from these 1997 uses (available upon request). 
11
 All NRI counties with CRP parcels have rent data; only non-CRP parcels are thus excluded.  Summary 
statistics including parcels without rent data are similar to those presented here (available upon request). 
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very high rate, and farmed land tends to continue to be farmed at a high rate.  Among the 
specified subsamples, Control-All (the general non-CRP land sample) is of better quality 
than all of the other groups are, including Control-Unfarmed (the land that left farming 
but did not enter CRP).  Both Control groups are of better quality than both CRP groups.  
CRP-Exit is of somewhat better quality by most measures than the CRP-Eligible group, 
which supports the intuition that some land leaves CRP specifically to be farmed.  
Interestingly, Control-Unfarmed is very slightly better than CRP-Exit on observable 
characteristics. 
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Table 7. Characteristics of Land in Subsets of NRI Sample 
 Farmed in 
1982 
CRP in 
1992 
CRP-Exit CRP-
Eligible 
Control-
All 
Control-
Unfarmed 
Prime farmland? 
a, d
 0.547 
(0.002) 
0.286 
(0.002) 
0.345 
(0.009) 
0.262 
(0.004) 
0.576 
(0.002) 
0.438 
(0.006) 
Good land class?
 a, 
c, d
 
0.952 
(0.001) 
0.875 
(0.002) 
0.888 
(0.005) 
0.873 
(0.002) 
0.960 
(0.001) 
0.895 
(0.004) 
Erodibility index 
a, 
d
 
7.330 
(0.026) 
12.990 
(0.971) 
12.209 
(0.221) 
13.759 
(0.108) 
7.176 
(0.030) 
10.579 
(0.221) 
Slope 
a, d
 2.759 
(0.009) 
4.260 
(0.018) 
4.841 
(0.010) 
4.270 
(0.025) 
2.783 
(0.011) 
4.166 
(0.046) 
Return: crops 
b
 93.365 
(0.150) 
80.739 
(0.097) 
96.169 
(0.754) 
81.074 
(0.275) 
94.863 
(0.168) 
98.626 
(0.820) 
Return: 
government 
payments
 b
 
10.967 
(0.014) 
8.856 
(0.010) 
9.364 
(0.063) 
8.870 
(0.275) 
11.192 
(0.016) 
9.023 
(0.061) 
Return: pasture
 b
 29.050 
(0.064) 
27.052 
(0.024) 
30.967 
(0.181) 
28.109 
(0.104) 
29.267 
(0.072) 
31.005 
(0.308) 
Return: range
 b
 10.912 
(0.032) 
11.228 
(0.027) 
8.937 
(0.201) 
11.179 
(0.064) 
10.872 
(0.036) 
10.553 
(0.145) 
Return: forest
 b
 11.725 
(0.044) 
12.189 
(0.011) 
21.662 
(0.140) 
12.807 
(0.065) 
11.659 
(0.049) 
14.453 
(0.181) 
Return: urban
 b
 2331.954 
(4.968) 
2426.994 
(3.711) 
2450.342 
(31.431) 
2566.866 
(8.409) 
2318.095 
(5.517) 
2260.462 
(21.918) 
Early CRP signup 
wave 
- 0.617 
(0.002) 
0.821 
(0.005) 
1 
(0) 
- - 
CRP cover of grass 
in 1992 
- 0.906 
(0.001) 
0.920 
(0.004) 
0.927 
(0.001) 
- - 
CRP in 1992 0.082 
(0.000) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
- - 
CRP in 1997 0.078 
(0.000) 
0.895 
(0.001) 
- 0.863 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
Farmed in 1992 0.821 
(0.001) 
- - - 0.921 
(0.001) 
- 
Farmed in 1997 0.790 
(0.001) 
0.053 
(0.001) 
0.528 
(0.007) 
0.068 
(0.002) 
0.891 
(0.001) 
0.271 
(0.005) 
Conservation 
practice if farmed 
in 1997 
0.233 
(0.001) 
0.251 
(0.013) 
0.258 
(0.014) 
0.271 
(0.016) 
0.232 
(0.001) 
0.181 
(0.008) 
Hundreds of acres 3,755,742 340,400 31,417 188,208 2,699,633 211,329 
Standard errors in parentheses 
a
 1997 land characteristic data  
b
 1996 land use returns 
c
 ―Good land class‖ is an indicator for land classification of 1, 2, 3, or 4, indicating few restrictions on use 
d
 Land characteristic data only available for certain land uses, so these are means over available data: 
erodibility index not available for pasture; erodibility and slope not available for pasture, range, forest, 
other rural; erodibility, slope, prime, and land class not available for urban, water, and federal land. 
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Table 7 also shows that 61.7% of all land that was in the CRP in 1992 was part of 
an early signup wave, but only 82.1% of all land that exited CRP between 1992-1997 was 
in an early signup wave (probably because of contract releases that were granted at that 
time).  Grass is the most common conservation cover planted on all land in CRP, and is 
not planted on CRP-Exit land at a higher rate (92%) than on CRP-Eligible land (92.7%).  
Consistent with intuition, most (86.3%) CRP-Eligible land stays in CRP in 1997, and 
most Control-All land was farmed in 1992 (92.1%) and 1997 (89.1%).  Finally, CRP-Exit 
land is unconditionally more likely to be farmed than the Control-Unfarmed sample.  
This result will continue to hold throughout the analyses. 
 
Results 
 
The data and methods employed allow an examination of land use outcome and 
the adoption of conservation practices on farmed land.  We will study land use outcome 
both as a binary choice (cultivated or not) and as a multinomial choice.  Here we can 
infer causality on the part of the CRP because we have strong reason to believe that we 
have matched parcels with similar characteristics.  In the conservation practice results, 
the sample is further restricted to land that is farmed in 1997.  There are competing 
reasons why ex-CRP land may adopt conservation practices at a higher rate, so we cannot 
infer causality for this result. 
 
Binary Land Use Outcome Results 
 
To study land use, we begin with a simple binary choice model.  The landowner 
chooses whether to put the land into ―farming‖ (cultivated cropland) or into some other 
use.  Other uses include non-cultivated cropland and pasture; these uses are obviously 
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important to agriculture, but cultivated cropland has a larger environmental impact so is 
of particular interest.  Cultivated cropland includes row and close crops.  The vast 
majority (95.58%) of 1997 non-cultivated cropland is used to grow hay.   
We form a naïve sample of all NRI observations for which county-level rent data 
are available.  Analysis of this broad sample provides interesting insights, as shown in 
Table 8.  In three different OLS specifications,
12
 we use mutually exclusive dummies to 
compare 1997 use of CRP land to 1997 use of other land.  Specification I uses dummies 
to indicate 1992 CRP participation and 1992 farming.  This specification shows that land 
that was in the CRP in 1992 is less likely to be farmed in 1997 than land that was farmed 
in 1992 and even than land that was neither farmed nor CRP in 1992.  Using the same 
data set, we perform a matching analysis using 1992 CRP participation as the treatment 
variable and the same explanatory variables as elements of the Mahalanobis metric and 
propensity score.  Using the matched sample, the estimate of average treatment effect on 
the treated indicates that CRP land is 73.8% (standard error 0.014) less likely to be 
farmed than all other land.  This result was driven by land that was farmed in 1992 and 
1997 and land that was in CRP in 1992 and 1997.   
  
                                                     
12
 Results are very similar for logit and probit specifications as well; results available upon request. 
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Table 8. Land Use Results with Naïve (Un-Pre-Processed) Sample 
 Specification I Specification II Specification III 
CRP dummy -0.233*** 
(0.005) 
  
Early CRP dummy  -0.216*** 
(0.006) 
 
Late CRP dummy  -0.260*** 
(0.005) 
 
CRPEXIT dummy   0.401*** 
(0.007) 
FARM92 dummy 0.629*** 
(0.005) 
0.629*** 
(0.005) 
0.791*** 
(0.003) 
N (hundreds of acres) 3,006,841 3,006,841 3,006,841 
F 15,619.34 19,859.11 3,311.24 
R
2
 0.616 0.616 0.612 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions are OLS. All included land was cultivated in 1982, is in a 
county for which rent data is available, and does not enter 1997 land uses: urban/built-up, water, or federal.  
Specifications control for 1997 land characteristics (prime farmland indicator, good land class indicator), 
1996 land use rents and changes, region code dummies, and land characteristic x rent interactions.  Survey 
regressions performed with data points appropriately weighted and clustered errors. 
 
Specification II in Table 8 replaces the CRP dummy with dummies to indicate 
early CRP signup and late CRP signup, with results similar to Specification I.  
Specification III in Table 8 hints at the need for pre-processing.  A dummy is included to 
indicate CRP exit, and this dummy has a positive coefficient.  This land is more likely to 
enter farming than the baseline group.  The baseline group, however, is unintuitive: it 
includes land that was not farmed in 1992 and land that stayed in (did not exit) CRP. 
For a more interpretable result, we must look to the re-specified subsamples.  
Results are shown in Table 9.  The table shows the coefficient on (or the marginal effect 
of) the CRP dummy.  Results are shown for OLS, logit, and probit regressions, and 
matching.  Covariate balancing tables for matching analyses are available upon request. 
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Table 9. Land Use Results with Pre-Processed Samples 
Specification: I II III IV 
What CRP land 
included? 
Early signup 
wave (CRP-
Eligible) 
Early signup 
wave (CRP-
Eligible) 
Exit 1992-7 
(CRP-Exit) 
Exit 1992-7 
(CRP-Exit) 
What non-CRP 
(previously farmed) 
land included? 
All land 
(Control-
All) 
Not farmed 
1992 (Control-
Unfarmed) 
All land 
(Control-
All) 
Not farmed 
1992 (Control-
Unfarmed) 
OLS -0.775*** -0.185*** -0.316*** 0.231*** 
Logit (marginal effect) -0.835*** -0.219*** -0.285*** 0.275*** 
Probit  (marginal effect) -0.823*** -0.224*** -0.301*** 0.266*** 
Matching (ATT) -0.712*** -0.159*** -0.305*** 0.207*** 
N (hundreds of acres) 2,887,997 399,719 2,731,206 242,928 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All included land was cultivated in 1982, is in a county for which rent data is available, and does not enter 
1997 land uses: urban/built-up, water, or federal.  Specifications control for 1997 land characteristics 
(prime farmland indicator, good land class indicator), 1996 land use rents and changes, region code 
dummies, and land characteristic x rent interactions.  Survey regressions performed with data points 
appropriately weighted and clustered errors. Matching uses Mahalanobis metric plus propensity score. 
 
Each specification (column) in Table 9 represents a combination of a treated 
(CRP) sample and a control (non-CRP) sample.  The results generate consistent estimates 
within each column, so the results are not driven by functional form.  However, the 
results change greatly between columns.  This is expected, since each treatment-control 
group pair represents a different question addressed to the data. 
Specifications I and II in Table 9 show results using the CRP-Eligible sample 
(CRP parcels that were part of early CRP signup waves) as the treatment group.  
Regardless of the control (non-CRP) group chosen, the CRP-Eligible parcels are less 
likely to be farmed than the counterfactuals.  Recall from Table 7 that 86.3% of CRP-
Eligible stayed in CRP.  As argued in the Methods section, the comparison of the CRP-
Eligible sample with non-CRP parcels does not address the question of post-CRP land 
use since much of the eligible land stayed in the program. 
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Specifications I and III in Table 9 show results using Control-All (non-CRP 
parcels that were farmed in 1982) as the control group.  In both cases, again, CRP parcels 
are less likely to be farmed.  This result is again informed by Table 7.  Most of the 
Control-All parcels are continuously farmed.  When we compare CRP land to this land, 
we are asking whether CRP makes a parcel more likely to be farmed as compared to most 
of the nation’s farmland, including the best land.  This may not be a causal relationship, 
since it may be driven by unobservable differences in land quality and transition costs. 
Specification IV in Table 9 is the most revealing.  Here, CRP-Exit (land that 
exited the CRP program between 1992 and 1997) is the treatment group.  It is compared 
to Control-Unfarmed—land that, though farmed in 1982, was in some other land use in 
the intervening years.  Control-Unfarmed land has been revealed, by the land use chosen 
by its landowner, to be similarly low-quality as compared to CRP land and to face similar 
transition costs to enter farming.  Therefore, the Control-Unfarmed land is the best 
counterfactual for CRP-Exit land for this research question.  In these analyses, the CRP-
Exit land is more likely to be farmed than the non-CRP land.  This treatment effect is not 
just statistically significant and consistent across specifications, but it is also 
economically significant, at 21-28%. 
To restate this result, the CRP seems to make this land 21-28% more likely to be 
farmed than it would have been had it never been in the CRP.  This result is expected if 
the returns to agriculture have increased on this land, which in turn is expected because 
CRP improves land quality.  (Control-Unfarmed land should have also improved while it 
was not farmed, but CRP’s period of non-farming is probably longer, and conservation 
practices that cause land improvement are subsidized in CRP.) 
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Is this result driven by the selective exit of only the best CRP land?  If CRP-Exit 
contained the upper envelope of CRP land, but Control-Unfarmed contained only very 
bad land, this difference in land quality would reduce the implications of the results.  To 
check, we reduce the CRP and non-CRP land samples to only the best land using a 
specification with only land indicated as prime farmland, and a specification with only 
land that has a relatively good (unrestricted) land classification.  Results are robust to 
these checks, with coefficients still significant and slightly increased in magnitude 
(available upon request).  Of course, this check has limited power if observable 
characteristics understate the differences in land characteristics.  It is still likely that the 
―best‖ CRP land (by unobservable characteristics) had a higher tendency to leave the 
program.  If this is the case, the magnitude of the effect observed is only accurate for the 
parcels that actually exited; the effect could be different (most likely smaller) if parcels 
were ejected from the program randomly or if the program were ended.  Even so, the 
tendency for CRP to cause at least some land to be more likely to be farmed is still 
compelling and interesting. 
As discussed in the Methods section, these results may be biased toward zero if 
Control-Unfarmed land is unobservably better than CRP-Exit land or if there is a delay in 
transitioning into farming, and the results may be biased upward if Control-Unfarmed 
land is unobservably worse than CRP-Exit land or is in a long fallow cycle.  This upward 
bias is less likely because Control-Unfarmed was shown to be (on average) better in 
observable qualities than CRP-Exit, and because the NRI tries to accurately record fallow 
land, but it is still possible. 
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We check the robustness of the matching result using Rosenbaum’s recommended 
sensitivity test (Rosenbaum 2002).  This test simulates conditions in which the treatment 
variable (1992 CRP participation) and the outcome (1997 farming of the land) are both 
driven by an unobservable factor.  This test assumes that the unobservable factor 
determines with certainty whether land will be farmed in 1997.  The correlation between 
this unobservable factor and the propensity to receive treatment (here, likelihood of being 
in CRP) is varied, and the test reports the range of unobservable values for which the 
matching result is still valid.  When CRP-Exit land is compared to Control-All and 
Control-Unfarmed land, the result is robust up to an unobservable factor of 2.7 and 2.6 
respectively.  That is, even if some parcels are 2.7 (or 2.6) times as likely to enter CRP 
due to an unobservable factor perfectly correlated with later farming, the matching result 
showing that CRP-Exit land is more likely to be farmed than Control-Unfarmed (and less 
likely to be farmed than Control-All) would still indicate a positive causal effect.
13
  These 
results do not tell us that there is such a factor; it simply indicates how strong a factor 
would have to be to create these results.  Since this test assumes that this unobservable 
factor wholly determines farming outcome, we feel that a robustness of 2.6 is sufficiently 
strong for these results to be convincing. 
 
Multinomial Land Use Outcome Results 
 
Cultivated cropping is the land use of greatest interest.  However, it is also 
interesting to learn how CRP participation affects the entire distribution of final land 
uses. Table 10 presents multinomial logit land use outcome results.  The specifications 
                                                     
13
 When CRP-Eligible parcels are compared to either control group, the result is robust up to an 
unobservable factor of at least 5. 
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(columns) again correspond to pairs of treatment and control groups.  Land use categories 
were:  cultivated cropland, non-cultivated cropland, pasture, CRP, and other.
14
  When 
CRP-Eligible is compared to either control group (Specifications I and II in Table 10), 
the results are mainly driven by the tendency of this CRP land, while probably eligible to 
exit, to stay in the program.  CRP-Eligible land is much more likely to be in CRP in 
1997, and less likely to be cultivated, than the control group.  Also, when compared to the 
Control-Unfarmed group, CRP-Eligible land is less likely to become non-cultivated 
cropland or pasture, which again is because most of CRP-Eligible stayed in the CRP (and 
much of Control-Unfarmed became or remained non-cultivated cropland or pasture).  
 
Table 10. Land Use Multinomial Logit Results 
Specification: I II III IV 
What CRP land 
included? 
Early signup 
wave (CRP-
Eligible) 
Early signup 
wave (CRP-
Eligible) 
Exit 1992-7 
(CRP-Exit) 
Exit 1992-7 
(CRP-Exit) 
What non-CRP 
(previously farmed) 
land included? 
All land 
(Control-All) 
Not farmed 
1992 (Control-
Unfarmed) 
All land 
(Control-All)
a
 
Not farmed 
1992 (Control-
Unfarmed)
a
 
Cultivated cropland -0.832*** -0.252*** -0.274*** 0.270*** 
Non-cultivated 
cropland 
-0.020*** -0.251*** 0.059*** -0.155*** 
Pasture 0.001 -0.245*** 0.126*** -0.095*** 
CRP 0.848*** 0.851*** N/A N/A 
Other 0.004*** -0.104*** 0.090*** -0.019*** 
N (hundreds of acres) 2,887,997 399,719 2,712,792 241,650 
F 3,169.99 722.44 213.20 51.66 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Cells show marginal effects of 1992 CRP status dummy on each land use.  All included land was cultivated 
in 1982, is in a county for which rent data is available, and does not enter 1997 land uses: urban/built-up, 
water, or federal.  Specifications control for 1997 land characteristics (prime farmland indicator, good land 
class indicator), 1996 land use rents and changes, and region code dummies.  Survey regressions performed 
with data points appropriately weighted and clustered errors. 
a
 For these regressions only, both Control groups exclude land that becomes CRP in 1997 (0.67% of 
Control-All and 0.53% of Control-Unfarmed). 
                                                     
14
 ―Other‖ includes rangeland, forest, and ―other rural‖; these uses make up small but significant elements 
of CRP-Eligible (2.19%), CRP-Exit (14.63%), Control-All (2.22%), and Control-Unfarmed (17.55%). 
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In Specifications III and IV of Table 10, in which land that exits CRP is compared 
to non-CRP land, the results again depend on the set of control parcels used.  When CRP-
Exit is compared to Control-All (Specification III), we see again that the ex-CRP land is 
less likely to be farmed, and that the ex-CRP land has a greater tendency to go into 
pasture, non-cultivated cropland (hay), and other uses.  This is unsurprising: as discussed 
above, most land that exits CRP is planted with grasses as a conservation cover, so the 
conversion to pasture is trivial, and the conversion to hay or other non-cultivated uses 
may also be inexpensive.  When CRP-Exit is compared to Control-Unfarmed in 
Specification IV, the ex-CRP land is 27% more likely to become cultivated cropland.  
This result is similar to the binary model estimates.  The CRP-Exit parcels are less likely 
than Control-Unfarmed parcels to be non-cultivated cropland or pasture in 1997.  This is 
probably because over 80% of Control-Unfarmed land had already been in non-cultivated 
cropland (47.54%) or pasture (36.25%) in 1992. 
Both pasture and non-cultivated cropland convert to cultivated cropland at 
relatively high rates: 44.8% of 1992 non-cultivated cropland, and 28.2% of 1992 pasture, 
was farmed in 1997.  The high rates of conversion to cropping over a five-year period 
demonstrated in these data may indicate some error in the NRI’s verification of fallow 
cycles.  We previously noted that (the issue of long fallows aside) CRP parcels have less 
opportunity to transition than do Control-Unfarmed parcels because CRP contracts end in 
1996.  This under-measurement of transition may be particularly large because CRP-Exit 
parcels that do not enter farming tend to enter non-cultivated cropland and pasture at a 
relatively high rate, and may therefore transition into farming in the future.  However, 
again, this would bias CRP’s tendency to enter cultivated cropland toward zero. 
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However, since the control (non-CRP) parcels of greatest interest were 
uncultivated in 1992 just as the CRP parcels were, transition costs are held constant 
between the treatment and control groups.  Further, while the ex-CRP parcels exited the 
program in or around 1996, the control parcels were bound by no contract and could 
make any transition that was profitable at any time after the 1992 observation.  This 
would bias the results to make the ex-CRP parcels look less likely to be farmed, and our 
result is robust to this direction of bias. 
 
Conservation Practice Results 
 
The 1997 NRI sample contains data on whether any of 22 different conservation 
practices was adopted on cultivated cropland, summarized in Table 7 for the populations 
of interest.  Of all acreage cultivated in 1997, 22.77% was engaged in some conservation 
practice.  The most popular practices were terraces (6.2% of land), contour farming 
(5.76%), grassed waterways (4.28%), and surface drainage (4.02%).  Most of the 
conservation practices help to conserve water and/or reduce erosion.  In some cases, these 
practices are strongly recommended or required for land that is very sensitive (e.g., 
highly erodible).  There are government programs at various levels to promote and 
subsidize practices of this type. 
Is ex-CRP land that becomes cultivated cropland more likely than other land to 
adopt these conservation practices?  Table 7 shows that unconditionally, cultivated ex-
CRP land appears more likely to adopt conservation practices than either cultivated 
Control-All or cultivated Control-Unfarmed land.  However, this unconditional result is 
confounded by differences in land quality and other factors. 
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The conservation practice analysis can be performed in much the same way that 
the land use outcome analysis was performed.  However, since some low-quality land is 
required to adopt conservation practices, the sample must first be reduced to include only 
land that is not highly erodible, with an erodibility index of 8 or less (results without the 
erodibility index restriction are similar, and available on request).  
Even after this extra restriction on the samples, causality cannot be attributed to 
the CRP.  While significant results could point to a causal role for the CRP, they could 
also indicate that the kinds of landowners who sign their land up for CRP are also the 
kinds of people who will adopt conservation practices (because of personal proclivity, 
better knowledge of government programs, or variation in local programs that promote 
conservation).  The land use model abstracts from landowner characteristics in a way that 
is fairly plausible for land use outcomes, since market returns should be strong drivers of 
land use.  However, in the decision to adopt conservation practices that assumption seems 
dubious for a number of reasons.  For example, government programs are not always 
easy for potential participants to understand, and idiosyncratic landowner information 
may not make its way into market prices.  Even without clear causality, however, the 
results are still interesting. 
Table 11 shows the coefficient of (or marginal effect for) CRP participation on 
the adoption of some conservation practice in 1997.  The columns again represent 
different combinations of ex-CRP and control (non-CRP) land, with data restricted to 
non-highly-erodible land that was cultivated in 1997.  In Specification I, the control 
group includes the portion of Control-All (all land farmed in 1982) that was farmed in 
1997.  For this comparison, the CRP land is not significantly more nor less likely to adopt 
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a conservation practice.  (Most of Control-All was farmed in 1992, but we cannot know 
which parcels adopted a conservation practice in 1992 because data on conservation 
practices for 1992 are not available.) 
 
Table 11. Conservation Practice Results 
 Specification I Specification II 
What CRP land included? Exit 1992-7 (CRP-Exit) Exit 1992-7 (CRP-Exit) 
What non-CRP (previously 
farmed) land included? 
All land (Control-All) Not farmed 1992 
(Control-Unfarmed) 
OLS 0.018 0.045** 
Logit 0.026 0.043** 
Probit 0.026 0.043* 
Matching 0.003 0.076** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Only non-highly-erodible land included 
Land was in the categories described in the text but only non-highly erodible (erodibility index of 8 or 
lower).  All included land was cultivated in 1982, is in a county for which rent data is available, and does 
not enter 1997 land uses: urban/built-up, water, or federal.  Specifications control for 1997 land 
characteristics (prime farmland indicator, good land class indicator, slope, and erodibility index), 1996 land 
use rents and changes, region code dummies, and land characteristic x rent interactions.  Survey regressions 
performed with data points appropriately weighted and clustered errors. Matching uses Mahalanobis metric 
plus propensity score. 
 
For Specification II of Table 11, the control group includes the portion of Control-
Unfarmed (land farmed in 1982 but not 1992) that was farmed in 1997.  In this 
specification, both CRP and non-CRP parcels faced a transition back into farming.  
Adopting a new conservation practice for the first time requires some investment of time 
and money, particularly in planning and design, so transition costs into farming with 
conservation practices are greater than transition costs into farming without conservation 
practices.  CRP parcels are 4-8% more likely to adopt a conservation practice than this 
very similar land.  This is large relative to the baseline adoption rate of conservation 
practices of 18.1% for this land. 
61 
 
 
 
We perform another Rosenbaum test for sensitivity to unobservable factors, and 
the conservation practice result is very sensitive to unobservable factors that increase the 
CRP signup rate by as little as 40%.  This leaves open the possibility that these results are 
driven by unobservable selection. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Conservation Reserve Program uses selective retirement of agricultural land 
to protect the environment and to increase long-term agricultural productivity.  There is a 
natural tension between this program’s goals.  The conflict between the agricultural and 
environmental goals of the CRP is particularly notable in land’s disposition after it leaves 
the CRP.  We seek causal effects of the CRP on later land use, and we find that CRP 
participation seems to cause land to be 21-28% more likely to be farmed than it would 
have been had it never been in the program.  This result is congruent with findings that 
the CRP improves land quality, because that improvement would increase the returns to 
cropping.  The CRP may act as a long, subsidized fallow period for some landowners. 
The innovation of our analysis is the use of a sample re-specification step.  This 
reduces bias by using the analyst’s knowledge to restrict the treatment and control groups 
to the most appropriate parcels.  Unobservable factors determine the potential returns to 
cropping and other land uses, so estimates of land use model parameters and elasticities 
may be biased if calculated using incomparable parcels.  Comparable parcels can be 
identified by their use:  land that is similarly low-quality and faces similar transition costs 
(i.e. land with similar unobservable characteristics) may drop out of regular cropping. 
We find that treatment effect estimation is very sensitive to the use of 
inappropriate data samples.  Once an appropriate sample is specified, however, results are 
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robust to different econometric specifications.  This sensitivity to data set specification 
may also be applicable to the calibrations used, for example, in general equilibrium 
simulations.  On a related note, we should be aware that the 21-28% increase in 
likelihood of farming is an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and that it is 
only applicable to parcels that exited CRP between 1992 and 1997.  It would be incorrect 
to infer that the same rate of increase in cultivation would occur on CRP parcels that did 
not exit by 1997, or on parcels that may enter CRP in the future.  Notably, it would be 
inappropriate to infer that if the CRP were dissolved, the end use of all ejected parcels 
would reflect a 21-28% increase in the likelihood of farming.  However, the results are 
still interesting in indicating that at least some CRP participants take advantage of CRP-
induced land improvements by farming their land more intensively. 
Is the increase in cultivation on these ex-CRP parcels socially desirable?  The 
welfare effects of this increased tendency to farm are ambiguous, so this question cannot 
be answered without use of a social welfare function that places explicit weight on the 
opposing environmental and agricultural benefits of the CRP.  However, some of the 
environmental damage that could result from this increased tendency to farm is mitigated 
by farmed ex-CRP land’s increased tendency to adopt conservation practices.   
Finally, we might infer from these results that farmers are being paid too much to 
conserve their land since they are getting productivity gains from the improved land, and 
that government payments are therefore inefficiently high.  On the other hand, if the 
bidding process were incentive-compatible, farmers’ CRP bids would be reduced by their 
expectation of productivity benefits.  If this were the case, inefficiency would be reduced. 
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Chapter III: Learning from Mistakes 
What Do Inconsistent Choices Over Risk Tell Us? 
 
Introduction 
 
We all make mistakes.  We take longer to complete tasks than we expected, or we 
make the wrong choice because we are in a hurry.  Psychologists have long recognized 
this problem and regularly include multiple questions in surveys that ask the same thing 
in order to increase reliability.  In experimental economics, the presence of inconsistent 
choices is common, particularly when experiments are taken to the field.  The view in 
economics has been to either ignore subjects with inconsistent choices or to make 
specialized assumptions on the nature of mistakes and estimate the parameters of interest.  
We take the view that mistakes can be inherently interesting and informative with regard 
to subjects' decision-making rules and cognitive costs.  We are particularly interested in 
how mistakes made in risk decisions can explain financial decisions.  We find that 
measures of error are correlated with demographics and financial instrument choices.  
This paper shows that there is much to be learned from mistakes. 
Several researchers (Birnbaum and Schmidt 2008; Carbone and Hey 2000; 
Harless and Camerer 1994; Hey 2005; Hey and Orme 1994; Loomes, Moffatt, and 
Sugden 2002) have shown that assumptions on the source and nature of mistakes are not 
innocuous in the identification of behavior patterns.  Much of this literature also shows, 
by collecting repeated observations on the same individuals, that the way subjects 
commit mistakes (or are inconsistent) is heterogeneous.   
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We use risk experiments that allow inconsistent choices to be made.  We define a 
mistake as a choice that does not reflect an individual’s true preferences.  We use the 
results of these experiments to study mistakes and then link those mistakes to financial 
decisions made in the marketplace. Participants are drawn from a random sample of the 
adult population in Rwanda, thus providing important variation in demographics and 
economic outcomes. This setting is well-suited to our study because subjects face risky 
decisions regularly in their daily lives and have access to a variety of (mainly informal) 
financial instruments. The sample is typical of adults found in urban and rural areas in 
many developing countries. The experiment is designed so that with fairly unrestrictive 
assumptions on utility, choices inconsistent with most reasonable theories can be detected 
in the data.  We find that risk aversion alone is a poor predictor of decisions, but mistakes 
and risk aversion correlate with the use of certain financial instruments, notably those that 
serve as safety nets. 
Mistakes, or inconsistent choices, have been linked to non-cognitive abilities such 
as motivation, attention, and patience.  Additionally, both cognitive and non-cognitive 
abilities have been linked to outcomes such as employment, wages, obesity, smoking, and 
saving decisions (e.g., Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Segal 2009). The use of 
economic experiments to look at cognitive and non-cognitive ability is more limited. 
Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) find that students with high standardized test scores 
are less likely to exhibit extreme risk aversion in small stakes gambles (which some 
consider irrational), and Sunde et al. (2010)  find people with lower IQ’s are more risk 
averse and impatient. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) look at hypothetical survey 
questions on time preferences and find that those who make time inconsistent choices are 
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more likely to take up a commitment savings product in the Philippines. In this research, 
we ask whether inconsistent choices in risk experiments relate to patterns of financial 
decisions taken in the marketplace.  We don’t know what pattern of financial decisions is 
optimal for any person, but if we find that tendency to err is correlated with financial 
decision-making, this would imply either that these subjects are making errors in their 
financial lives or that they are hedging to protect themselves against their own errors. 
Decision-making inconsistencies have been observed in several experimental 
studies, including decisions over risk (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002), health (Stockman 
2006), and time preferences (Castillo et al. 2009).  Prasad and Salmon (2007) find, using 
a risk experiment similar to ours, that subjects who make inconsistent choices over risk 
earn less than those who make consistent decisions in a principal-agent experiment. 
In previous research, these inconsistencies have been frequently ignored, under 
the assumption that they are uninformative noise.  Alternatively, choices are restricted so 
that inconsistent behavior cannot be observed.  In risk experiments, this can be done by 
giving the subject only a single decision to make.  For example, Binswanger (1980), one 
of the first to use such a method, gives a menu of lotteries over which the subject chooses 
one.  Subjects can be asked to pick a point at which they switch from risky to safe 
lotteries (see Harrison and Rutstrom 2008; Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 2010). 
Andersen et al. (2006) use an iterative procedure to hone in on the subject’s switch point, 
and, consequentially, subjects make significantly fewer unexpected choices.  The 
advantage of these methods is that they provide clear estimates of risk aversion by 
eliminating the possibility of mistakes. 
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We are interested in knowing the relationship between mistakes, lottery-measured 
risk aversion, and financial decisions.  Results in the literature relating lottery-measured 
risk preferences to economic decisions have been mixed.  Eckel et al. (2007) find that 
risk-averse individuals are more likely to take up experimentally-provided education 
financing.  Bellemare and Shearer (2006) find that risk aversion is correlated with job 
sorting, and Dohmen et al. (2010) find that lottery measures of risk do not relate to risky 
behaviors but a general risk question does. Harrison, List, and Towe (2007) argue that the 
reason for these mixed results may be background risk.   
Our results are surprising and may offer additional insight into the existing results 
relating risk aversion to important outcomes.  While we find no correlation between risk 
aversion and outcomes, we do find one when we also control for mistakes.  Absent 
mistakes, as we would expect, risk-averse subjects are more likely to be in a savings 
group and less likely to take an informal loan.  Risk preferences interact with the 
tendency to make mistakes in significant and sensible ways.  As risk aversion increases, 
those who are more likely to make mistakes become less likely to belong to a savings 
group and more likely to take out an informal loan.  Those who make mistakes seem to 
be missing out on potentially beneficial opportunities or taking on risks when they should 
not.  Making mistakes in one task may be linked to less than optimal behavior in another.  
Being able to observe these types of behavioral biases is essential to understanding 
financial decisions. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes financial decisions 
people make in Rwanda. Section 3 describes the experiment and defines inconsistent 
choices. Section 4 describes the data and presents the results. Section 5 concludes.  
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Financial Instruments in Rwanda  
 
The formal financial sector in Rwanda is limited and is consistently rated as one 
of the worst in the world (World Bank Group Doing Business Project 2007).  Because of 
this, many Rwandans rely on informal channels for credit.  We will look at three common 
types of informal credit (savings groups, insurance groups and informal loans) and formal 
credit offered through banks and credit unions. 
Savings groups (tontines) are rotating credit associations that allow members to 
pool risk, keep precautionary savings, and have access to credit.  These groups are 
common and popular in Rwanda.  Members deposit a fixed amount of money at a fixed 
interval (typically monthly).  Once every interval, one member of the group receives all 
the money deposited by the members.  Members may leave the group without penalty 
once the cycle in which all group members receive the pool of money is complete.  
Groups vary in size and in interval length (e.g., monthly or every two months).  It has 
been noted (e.g., Besley 1995) that tontines may serve risk-sharing functions for 
members who have negative shocks.  We expect risk-averse individuals to be more likely 
to join this kind of group. 
Insurance groups (groupes d’entraide) exist in two general forms.  The first is a 
rotating work group for construction or agricultural work.  Members help each other by 
exchanging labor.  The second offers financial assistance in the case of a bad shock like 
death or illness.  It functions as insurance.  More generally, the group may offer moral 
support.  Unfortunately, the data we have do not distinguish between these two general 
forms.  These groups sometimes also have a religious component to them because many 
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are organized by churches. Members typically pay a monthly fee to belong.  Since the 
risk-pooling nature of these groups is not necessarily monetary, we do not expect risk 
aversion over money to be as strongly correlated with membership. 
Informal loans are widespread in Rwanda.  They are usually short-term and small, 
and they are largely used for immediate consumption smoothing.  Most are store credit or 
cash loans from family and friends.  These loans are almost always interest free, but they 
are given with an expectation that the favor will be reciprocated.  Default on these loans 
is risky:  it may close doors to future borrowing and generally damage relationships with 
friends and family.  Because of the obligation involved and the high cost of default, we 
expect risk-averse individuals to be less likely to take out these loans. 
Formal credit is not widely accessible because of large financial barriers.  To be 
eligible to apply for a formal loan, an individual must pay an application fee and maintain 
an account in the bank or credit union.  Minimum deposits in banks are often very high 
relative to Rwandan incomes, and membership in a credit union requires paying a small 
fee.  Credit unions are more accessible than banks for the poor since the membership fee 
is far lower than the minimum balance at a bank.  Many poor people become credit union 
members precisely to get access to credit.  Formal banks and credit unions are relatively 
stable; however, before 2000, credit unions had a reputation for making loans and not 
asking that they be paid back.  Since 2000, regulation has made credit unions more 
accountable and stable.  In this era, the country has been much more politically stable 
than in previous decades (after 1994’s horrific Rwandan genocide).  Trust in the 
government and in institutions in general is still weak, but there is some trust in the 
financial sector.  Formal loans are primarily used for business and construction, rather 
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than consumption smoothing.  It is not clear how risk aversion will affect the probability 
of taking out a formal loan because the barriers to entry clearly select a certain segment 
of the population.  This population might be relatively risk averse or risk seeking.  
 
Experiment 
 
The experiment was done in conjunction with a 2002 World Council of Credit 
Unions survey on the economic activities and household characteristics of a random 
sample of credit union members and non-members in seven locations across Rwanda. In 
each location, fifty members and fifty non-members were interviewed, for a total of 700 
respondents. Members were randomly selected from lists of active credit union members, 
and non-members were randomly selected from neighborhoods served by the credit 
union. Survey respondents were at least 18 years old and were asked questions about 
household demographics, economic activities of household members, and credit use. 
Interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda, the primary Rwandan language, by Rwandan 
enumerators.
15
  The enumerators were trained and tested by the experimenters. 
At the end of the survey, each respondent was asked to complete two lottery 
experiments.  One set of lotteries (which we will call the gain lotteries) had only positive 
earnings, and the other (the gain-loss lotteries) had positive and negative earnings.  We 
chose these payment structures for the following reasons.  The gain payment structure is 
similar to many experiments in the literature (e.g., Binswanger 1980).  The gain-loss 
structure better mimics the type of risky outcomes an individual might face in his day-to-
day life. We will see that the latter payment structure better explains economic decisions. 
                                                     
15
 For a complete description of the data and survey design, refer to Petrie (2002). 
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Of the 700 respondents, 15 received pilot treatments that were not designed to 
generate usable data, and another 62 were unable or unwilling to complete the full lottery 
experiment, so 623 individuals provided risk preference data.  Of those, 442 received a 
treatment that presented a menu of five lotteries at once and asked the subject to choose 
one (similar to Binswanger 1980).  This five-pair simultaneous presentation treatment, by 
design, did not allow the subjects to make mistakes.  This will serve as a comparison 
treatment when we look at how risk measures predict financial decisions.  The remaining 
181 subjects received sequential binary-choice lotteries that did permit mistakes.  Eighty-
two subjects participated in a treatment with low payoff levels (55 with hypothetical and 
27 with real payments) and 99 saw a treatment with high payoffs (all hypothetical). 
The 181 participants of the sequential-choice lottery game are similar on 
observable characteristics to the larger survey population of 700 individuals.  All 181 of 
these subjects lived either in the capital Kigali or in the towns of Gitarama or Butare in 
the south of Rwanda. The survey population and the sequential-choice lottery participants 
have similar gender ratios (39.0% female for the sequential-choice lottery participants 
and 39.4% for the survey population), average ages (36.6 and 37.2, respectively), and 
average monthly per capita incomes (30,897 RWF and 34,520 RWF, respectively). Like 
the survey population, 93% of the sequential-choice lottery participants are literate. 
Compared to the 2002 official Rwandan national census, the survey population is similar 
on many demographic dimensions.  However, the survey population is slightly richer and 
more literate than the national average in Rwanda.  This may be because credit union 
members, who made up 2% of the Rwandan population, were oversampled. 
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Experiment Design 
 
In the sequential-choice experiment, subjects face a series of five pairs of 
lotteries, each with 50-50 odds, and are asked to choose one lottery (A or B) in each pair.  
The lottery pairs are shown in Table 12; the left half shows the low-payoff lotteries and 
the right half shows the high-payoff lotteries.  The gain and gain-loss lotteries are 
increasing in expected payoff and variance, and in each pair, lottery B has a lower 
expected payoff and variance.  Also, in each subsequent pair, option B has the same 
payoffs as option A in the previous pair.  If choices are consistent, this lottery exercise is 
equivalent to presenting subjects six lotteries simultaneously and asking them to choose 
one.  
 
Table 12. Lottery Treatment Payoffs (in Rwandan Francs, 500 RWF=$1 US*) 
Low Stakes (Real and Hypothetical)  High Stakes (Hypothetical only) 
Gain Lotteries  Gain Lotteries 
 A B   A B 
G1 (700, 400) (500, 500)  G1 (1650, 1000) (1250, 1250) 
G2 (900, 300) (700, 400)  G2 (2050, 750) (1650, 1000) 
G3 (1100, 200) (900, 300)  G3 (2450, 500) (2050, 750) 
G4 (1300, 100) (1100, 200)  G4 (2850, 250) (2450, 500) 
G5 (1500, 0) (1300, 100)  G5 (3250, 0) (2850, 250) 
       
Gain-Loss Lotteries  Gain-Loss Lotteries 
 A B   A B 
L1 (700, -100) (500, 0)  L1 (1650, -200) (1250, 0) 
L2 (900, -200) (700, -100)  L2 (2050, -400) (1650, -200) 
L3 (1100, -300) (900, -200)  L3 (2450, -600) (2050, -400) 
L4 (1300, -400) (1100, -300)  L4 (2850, -800) (2450, -600) 
L5 (1500, -500) (1300, -400)  L5 (3250, -1000) (2850, -800) 
* At the time of this research, median per capita annual income in Rwanda was 118,000 RWF, according to 
the US Department of State, so 500 RWF was roughly equivalent to a day’s wage. From our survey data, 
median monthly per capita income and expense measures were between 15,000 – 18,000 RWF, and this 
would imply a daily wage (based on 5 working-days a week) of 691- 830 RWF in our sample. 
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A risk-neutral or risk-loving individual would always choose A.  An individual 
with a concave utility function would start with option A and switch to lottery B as 
expected payoffs and variance increase and continue to choose option B. Since the 
subject’s ―switching point‖ may occur above or below the wealth range of the lotteries 
presented to the subjects, strongly risk-averse subjects may always choose option B, 
while less risk-averse subjects may always choose option A.  
The format of the experiment is similar to Holt and Laury (Holt and Laury 2002), 
hereafter HL, but with several key differences.  HL keep payoffs constant and vary the 
probabilities of receiving the high and low outcomes.  In our experiment, the probability 
is always 50-50, which is easier to administer and perhaps to understand, and the payoffs 
are varied.  Also, HL present the lotteries all at once to the subjects.  In our experiment, 
lottery pairs are presented sequentially.  Finally, in addition to lotteries over gains, we 
also present lotteries over gains and losses (as in Laury and Holt 2005). 
 
Experiment Implementation 
 
Before they start making decisions, subjects are told that one of the five lotteries 
in each set will be randomly chosen for implementation by pulling a number between one 
and five from a hat and then a coin will be flipped to determine payment.  After the 
procedures are explained, the subject is allowed to practice briefly with a sample lottery 
pair.  Then all lottery pairs are presented one at a time and in the same order for all 
subjects.  For example, in the gain lottery, subjects are first presented with the payoffs for 
G1 and are asked if they would prefer lottery A or lottery B.  Next, they are presented the 
payoffs for G2 and asked to choose between A and B, and so on.  They must choose one 
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of the lotteries in each case.  They are not allowed to declare indifference.  Once subjects 
have made decisions for the gain lotteries, they are presented with the gain-loss lotteries 
one by one and in the same order.   
When all lotteries have been completed, one lottery is randomly chosen from the 
gain sequence and another from the gain-loss sequence.  A coin is flipped for the chosen 
lottery in each sequence. If the coin turns up heads, the subject would earn the first 
number in the payoff pair for the chosen lottery.  For example, if lottery G3 was 
randomly chosen in the low payoff treatment and the subject chose option A for G3, then 
if the coin flip turned up tails, the subject would earn 200 RWF.  
Subjects in the real-payment treatment were given 500 RWF as a show-up fee and 
paid the outcomes of the coin tosses for the gain and the gain-loss lotteries.  They were 
paid in cash. Subjects in the hypothetical treatments were not paid.  After the two coin 
flips, they were told what they would have earned had they been paid.
16
  
The majority of the subjects received a hypothetical-payment treatment because 
of limited funding.  There is some debate in the literature as to whether real payoffs are 
necessary to incentivize choices in lottery experiments.  Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
note, in a review of 74 experiments, that the effect of real payoffs in risk experiments is 
unclear—in some cases there is no effect, and in some cases subjects appear more or less 
risk averse.  Ortmann and Hertwig (2006), while noting the importance of financial 
incentives, emphasize the importance of a ―do-it-both-ways‖ rule so that experimenters 
can compare results of financially motivated and non-motivated treatments.  This is what 
                                                     
16
 While they were not paid, subjects in the hypothetical treatments evinced an interest in the outcome of 
the coin toss. That is, they seemed to care about their hypothetical earnings. This suggests they paid 
attention to their decisions. 
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we do in this paper.  We test for a significant behavioral difference in subject choices 
between the real and hypothetical treatments, and find none.  Therefore, we pool the data. 
 
Defining Anomalous Choices 
 
Under relatively unrestrictive assumptions on preferences over risk, the pattern of 
predicted choices in the sequential-choice experiment is as follows.  A risk-neutral or 
risk-seeking subject would always choose lottery A.  A risk-averse subject may choose 
one of six lottery patterns, AAAAA, AAAAB, AAABB, AABBB, ABBBB, or BBBBB, 
in order of increasing risk aversion.  If a subject ever chooses B (the safe lottery) in one 
lottery pair and then subsequently chooses A (the risky lottery), his choice pattern is 
inconsistent with most theories.  Relative to a given lottery, he has now expressed a 
preference for both a safer lottery and a riskier lottery.  As shown in Appendix C, such a 
pattern of choices is not predicted by Expected Utility Theory, the Dual Theory (which is 
even more restrictive, only allowing the patterns AAAAA and BBBBB), or Expected 
Value theory (which only allows AAAAA).  As the Appendix also shows, with a few 
additional (but reasonable) assumptions, Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, and 
Cumulative Prospect Theory predict the same six lottery choice patterns.  Thus, we argue 
that choice patterns containing a switch from B to A are mistakes in the sense that they 
are unlikely to reflect a subject’s actual preferences over risk. 
If a choice violating these patterns—that is, a choice pattern in which there is a 
switch from B to A—represents true preferences and our assumptions are met, there are 
three possible explanations.  First, he could be truly indifferent between one or both pairs 
of lotteries.  This would require a flat utility function over wealth, and we consider this 
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rather unlikely.  Second, he could be ―practically‖ indifferent, in the sense that the 
difference between his utility from option A is close to his utility from option B—so 
close that he cannot detect the difference.  This is quite possible, but we would consider 
this a mistake because the decision does not reflect true preferences because cognitive 
costs have (in a sense) interfered with the expression of those preferences.  Third, he 
could have a ―humpy‖ indifference function, with an inflection point in the range of these 
lotteries.  Figure 6 uses expected utility is used to demonstrate an example in which a 
sure thing of 500 is preferred to a lottery with equal-odds outcomes of 400 and 700, but a 
lottery with equal-odds outcomes of 300 and 900 is also preferred to the 400-700 lottery.  
A ―humpy‖ utility function has been proposed (notably in Friedman and Savage 1948), 
particularly for the case of consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2007), but it 
seems unlikely that there should be a hump in just the right place to explain switching-
back behavior in our lotteries. 
 
Figure 6. Preferences Over Wealth to Explain Inconsistency 
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There are three aspects of the experiment that could cause some unexpected 
behavior, but neither should cause inconsistent ―switching-back.‖  First, since two 
decisions will be implemented, subjects could make their decisions as if putting together 
a risk portfolio.  This should make subjects choose riskier options, but consistently.  
Second, since one gain and one gain-loss lottery is implemented at random, errors may 
occur due to faulty compounding of lotteries.  However, that should simply make people 
behave in a consistent, but more risk-averse, fashion (Holt 1986).  Third, there may be 
order effects since the gain-loss lotteries are always performed after the gain lotteries.  
This is not a problem for this analysis because we do not try to compare choices over 
gain to choices over gain-loss. 
As discussed briefly above, indifference between lottery pairs could generate 
some switches from safe to risky lotteries (switches that we consider inconsistent).  For 
example, if a person is truly indifferent between a pair of lotteries, he may choose more 
or less randomly between the two.  However, it is not clear how to interpret widespread 
indifference from the point of view of theory.  If a person’s preferences are such that 
lottery B, with a low expected value and a low variance, and lottery A, with a higher 
expected value and a higher preference, are exactly (or nearly) indifferent, this means that 
the increase in expected value gained with A perfectly offsets the disutility imposed by 
the increased variance.  While this may explain a small number of inconsistent switches, 
it is unreasonable to expect that this would be the case in a large number of such switches 
as we see in this experiment, especially since some subjects exhibit ―double switch-
backs‖ (switch B to A twice).  Alternately, a utility function that does not vary with 
wealth will generate indifference across all lotteries, which may cause people to choose 
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randomly and thus apparently make inconsistent switches.  This also seems unlikely.  It 
may be more realistic to interpret ―indifference‖ as an inability to know one’s own 
preference or an error in evaluating the lotteries; a person has real preferences between 
each lottery pair, but fails in some way to access those preferences (perhaps because of 
cognitive costs) and thus falls back on random choice or a rule of thumb for some lottery 
pairs.  This kind of indifference can also be considered a mistake.   
 
Results 
 
We look first at inconsistent choices. Then, we examine measurements of risk 
aversion and estimations of mistakes, and finally, we relate risk aversion measures and 
inconsistent choice to financial decisions. 
 
Inconsistent Choices 
 
Of the 181 people who completed the sequential choice lottery treatment, roughly 
55% made at least one inconsistent switch over gains or losses. This is a similar 
percentage to that found with the same instrument in a random sample of adults in Peru.
17
  
Table 13 illustrates the distribution of lottery choices across predicted patterns and 
inconsistent switches.  Because the real and hypothetical distributions for low payoffs are 
not significantly different, we pool these two treatments.
18
  We can conclude that either 
                                                     
17
 Peru results are from a work in progress.  The hypothetical choices from the Peru instrument (which 
allowed indifference, allowed subjects to review and change decisions, and included both hypothetical and 
paid lotteries) found 52% of choices over gains and 44% of choices over gain-loss were inconsistent.  In 
other research, inconsistent choices made up varying percentages of choices: Holt and Laury (2002) found 
13% in hypothetical choices with students, Stockman (2006) found 11% in hypothetical choices with 
adults, Castillo, Ferraro, Jordan and Petrie (2009) found 33% in paid choices with 13-year olds, and Prasad 
and Salmon (2007) found 30% in paid choices with students (presenting lotteries sequentially as we did). 
18
 A Fisher’s exact test between real and hypothetical stakes for equal distributions over gains has a p-
value=0.431 and over gain-loss, p-value=0.439.  
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mistakes are not caused by lack of financial incentives, or the real lotteries are not 
sufficiently incentivized.  Since the pay from low stakes lotteries is on the order of one to 
two days pay for our subjects, we believe the latter to be the case.  However, mistakes are 
the topic of this study, so our results are still interesting even if mistakes are due to a 
failure of saliency (note that the difference in expected value of two lotteries in each pair 
is actually rather low).  There is, however, a significant difference between high and low 
payoff treatments.  High stakes may be easier to focus on or may be a cognitively easier 
task.  HL also found that higher-stakes lotteries resulted in a lower tendency to choose 
inconsistently (5.5%). 
 
Table 13. Distribution of Choices over Sequential-Choice Lottery Treatments (in percent) 
 
Gain Lotteries Gain-Loss Lotteries 
Choice Pattern All 
Low 
Payoffs* 
High  
Payoffs All 
Low 
Payoffs* 
High  
Payoffs 
AAAAA 12.7 9.8 15.2 8.8 12.2 6.1 
AAAAB 11.1 2.4 18.2 2.8 3.7 2.0 
AAABB 5.5 4.9 6.1 0.6 0.0 1.0 
AABBB 3.3 1.2 5.1 1.7 1.2 2.0 
ABBBB 6.1 3.7 8.1 4.4 3.7 5.1 
BBBBB 7.7 4.9 10.1 27.1 8.5 42.4 
One anomalous switch 47.0 58.5 37.4 42.0 48.8 36.4 
Two anomalous switches 6.6 14.6 0.0 12.7 22.0 5.1 
Total 181 82 99 181 82 99 
* Real and hypothetical payoff treatments are combined. 
 
There are other possible categorizations that could capture people who are 
consistent with some other decision mechanism.  For example, a subject may use a ―rule 
of thumb‖ wherein he chooses all A’s or all B’s but can deviate once (to test the waters).  
Using this categorization only helped explain 30 more choices (16.6%) over gains and 37 
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(20.4%) more choices over losses, leaving 67 (37.0%) choices over gains and 62 (34.3%) 
over losses still classified as inconsistent.  No simple ―rule of thumb‖ categorization 
explained a larger number of inconsistent choices, so all choices thus categorized remain 
identified as inconsistent. 
How do subjects’ choices change between gain and loss lotteries?  We categorize 
the choice pattern AAAAA as ―consistent risk loving,‖ the patterns AAAAB, AAABB, 
AABBB, and ABBBB as ―consistent risk averse,‖ and the pattern BBBBB as ―consistent 
strong risk averse.‖  The shaded region of Table 14 shows the pattern of consistent and 
inconsistent choices over gains and losses.  Of those choosing consistently, most are 
strongly risk-averse in the loss lottery.  Conditioning on having made a consistent choice 
over gain and loss, 10% were more risk-averse over gain than over loss, 38% were 
equally risk-averse over gain and loss, and 52% were more risk-averse over loss than 
over gain. This means that of the subjects that made consistent choices, a little over half 
made choices consistent with a concave utility function over gains and losses. In terms of 
inconsistencies, roughly half of the subjects made the same number of inconsistent 
choices over gain as over losses.  More people made two inconsistent switches over 
losses than over gains.  
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Table 14. Choices over Gain and Loss (Numbers of Subjects) 
C
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Choices over loss 
 Consistent 
strong risk-
averse 
Consistent 
risk-
averse 
Consistent 
risk-
loving 
Inconsistent 
one-switch 
Inconsistent 
two-switch 
Total 
Consistent 
strong risk-
averse 
9 1 0 3 1 14 
Consistent 
risk-averse 
14 6 4 21 2 47 
Consistent 
risk-loving 
9 3 4 5 2 23 
Inconsistent 
one-switch 
16 6 8 40 15 85 
Inconsistent 
two-switch 
1 1 0 7 3 12 
Total 49 17 16 76 23 181 
 
 
Risk Aversion 
 
The overwhelming presence of inconsistent choices makes a risk measure based 
on a switching point from risky to safe lotteries in our data problematic, since many 
subjects have multiple switching points.  It would be possible to use a structural model 
that allows for error to determine a risk aversion parameter and an error parameter either 
for the population or for subpopulations (for example, using a finite mixture model).  
However, we wish to obtain a measure of error and of risk aversion for each subject and 
to do so with the fewest possible assumptions on the form of preferences.  As a result, we 
will generate a simple proxy index of risk aversion and (as discussed in the next section) 
estimate a probability of having made a mistake for each subject. 
Our proxy for risk aversion (as in HL) is simply the number of B (safe) choices 
the person made.  This gives us a risk-aversion measure over gain and one over gain-loss 
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for each subject.  The higher this measure, the more risk-averse the person is.  So that the 
risk aversion measure for subjects who participated in sequential-choice lotteries can be 
compared to that of subjects who participated in five-pair simultaneous presentation 
lotteries, both were normalized to fall in the range from 0 to 1.
19
  This allows us to see if 
the two methods produce different measures of risk aversion. 
The treatment that forces consistency (five-pair) yields risk measures that are 
significantly higher than in the treatment that allows for inconsistent choices (sequential 
choice).  To compare similar payoffs, we restrict our discussion to the comparison of the 
five-pair treatment’s results with those from the low payoff sequential treatment.  Table 
15 shows that risk measures are 0.12 points higher over gains, and 0.10 points higher 
over gain-loss.  These differences are significant (t-test for difference in means: over 
gains p-value = 0.000, over gain-loss p-value = 0.076).  
 
Table 15. Mean Risk Aversion Measures by Lottery Treatment 
 Sequential-Choice 
Low Payoff* 
Sequential-Choice 
High Payoff 
Simultaneous 
Five-Pair  
Risk aversion over gain 0.44 
(0.25) 
0.43 
(0.32) 
0.56 
(0.37) 
Risk aversion over gain-loss 0.43 
(0.28) 
0.72 
(0.32) 
0.53 
(0.37) 
N 82 99 442 
* Real and hypothetical payoff treatments are combined. 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
                                                     
19
 For the simultaneous five-pair lottery, subjects are shown five lotteries with a 50-50 chance of either 
payoff and asked to choose one. The five lotteries over gains are, (500,500), (800,400), (1100,300), (1400, 
200), (1700,100). The lotteries over gain-loss are, (0,0), (300,-100), (600,-200), (900,-300), (1200,-400). 
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In the sequential-choice high payoff treatment, people are much more risk averse 
over losses (0.72) than any other treatments. Holt and Laury (2002) also saw an increase 
in risk aversion over high stakes. 
 
Error Choice Model 
 
While we can count the number of safe choices to derive a risk measure in the 
sequential choice lottery, this assumes that those who chose a predicted consistent pattern 
did not make a mistake.  In a sense, choices we identified as inconsistent are only the 
most egregious mistakes; in addition to these errors, it is possible for a subject to 
mistakenly choose a consistent lottery choice pattern that is not best for him.  To address 
this, and because we have few observations per individual, we use the error choice model 
proposed by Harless and Camerer (1994) to estimate the probability each individual made 
one or more mistake (given his lottery choice pattern) and the distribution of preferences 
over predicted patterns.  
The intuition behind this approach is that we assume that every individual has a 
latent preferred pattern that reflects well-behaved preferences, and that some people make 
mistakes in one or more lottery decisions.  We assume in each lottery decision, a subject 
chooses his preferred option with probability (1-ε)—that is, he errs with probability ε.  If 
a subject actually prefers pattern AAAAA, for example, the probability he chooses that 
pattern is the joint probability that he will make no mistakes over the five choices: (1-ε)5.  
If he makes exactly one mistake, he will instead choose BAAAA, ABAAA, AABAA, 
AAABA, or AAAAB, and the probability that he makes any of these choices is ε×(1-ε)4.  
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We assume that preferences are distributed through the population with proportions 
P(AAAAA), P(AAAAB), P(AAABB), P(AABBB), P(ABBBB), and P(BBBBB).   
Say that a subject chooses a pattern BAAAA.  That could reflect true preferences 
of AAAAA with one error, true preferences of AAAAB with two errors, true preferences 
of AAABB with three errors, true preferences of AABBB with four errors, true 
preferences of ABBBB with five errors, or true preferences of BBBBB with four errors.  
The likelihood of observing pattern BAAAA is the sum of the likelihoods of each of 
these possibilities: P(AAAAA)×ε×(1-ε)4+P(AAAAB)×ε2×(1-ε)3+ P(AAABB)×ε3×(1-ε)2+ 
P(AABBB)×ε4×(1-ε)+ P(ABBBB)×ε5+ P(BBBBB)×ε4×(1-ε). 
Given individual likelihoods calculated as in this example, we maximize, with 
regard to ε and the population preference proportions (e.g., P(AAAAA)), the joint 
likelihood of observing the patterns in our data.  The estimated ε and proportions allow us 
to estimate the probability that any pattern reflects at least one mistake.  For example, a 
subject who chooses AAAAA may be making no mistake (may truly prefer AAAAA) or 
may be making one or more mistake.  The probability AAAAA was chosen is the 
P(AAAAA) ×(1-ε)5+P(AAAAB)×ε×(1-ε)4+ P(AAABB)×ε2×(1-ε)3+ P(AABBB)×ε3×(1-
ε)2+ P(ABBBB)×ε4×(1-ε)+ P(BBBBB)×ε5.  Only the first term reflects the expression of 
true preferences; therefore, the likelihood that AAAAA reflects a mistake is reflected in 
all of the other terms—or, alternatively, one minus the probability of no mistakes.  In this 
way, we calculate the likelihood that each choice pattern reflects at least one mistake (the 
likelihood that it does not reflect his true preferences).  Thus, for each subject we have 
the probability he made a mistake over each set of lotteries (gain or gain-loss) based on 
his lottery choices and the parameters estimated by maximum likelihood.   
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Any subject who makes an egregiously inconsistent choice (i.e. a switch from B 
to A) has, using this method, a mistake probability of 1.  If we simply used an indicator 
for these egregious mistakes, we would undercount mistakes by assigning all allowed 
patterns a mistake probability of 0 when some of those probably do not reflect the true 
preferences of the subject. 
We estimated the distribution of true preferences given the observed choice 
patterns for all lotteries pooled together, for low-stakes only, and for high-stakes only.  
The results are shown in Table 16. The error rate, ε, is 0.222 and 0.217 for the pooled 
gain and gain-loss lotteries, and as expected, the error rate is higher at low stakes.  The 
error rate estimates compare well to estimates for several experiments examined in 
Harless and Camerer (1994), where error rate estimates were 0.209 - 0.339 for Expected 
Utility Theory.  Our gain-loss lotteries have a much higher proportion of people who 
choose all safe lotteries (BBBBB), especially for high payoffs. 
 
Table 16. Estimated Population Preferences for Lottery Choice Patterns 
 All Low Payoffs High Payoffs 
Choice 
Pattern 
Gain  Gain-Loss  Gain  Gain-Loss  Gain  Gain-Loss  
AAAAA 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.67 0.25 0.19 
AAAAB 0.31 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.30 0.02 
AAABB 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
AABBB 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
ABBBB 0.22 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.22 0.06 
BBBBB 0.13 0.59 0.14 0.26 0.14 0.73 
       
 0.22 0.22 0.34 0.31 0.13 0.15 
Likelihood 
function 
-3.18 -3.09 -3.39 -3.34 -2.85 -2.62 
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Inconsistent Choice and Financial Decisions 
 
First, we look at who makes mistakes. Then, we examine how risk aversion and 
mistakes affect financial decisions. 
Table 17 shows summary statistics for the entire sample and for those who 
completed the sequential choice lottery.  The variables included are the percent of 
subjects who are female, the percent married, the subject’s age in years, the number of 
years of education the subject has completed, the subject’s household per capita monthly 
expenses in Rwandan francs, the number of children under 18 years old living in the 
subject’s household, the number of adults 50 years and older in the household, the 
percent of subjects in a savings group, the percent in an insurance group, the percent 
having take an informal loan in the past year, and the percent having taken a formal loan 
in the past five years.  We can see that the entire sample and those who completed the 
sequential choice lottery are similar on most variables, with the exception that those in 
the sequential choice lottery are not as rich and are more likely to have used credit. 
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Table 17. Summary Statistics 
 All Lottery Subjects Sequential-Choice 
Subjects 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Female 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.48 
Married 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48 
Age (years) 36.58 11.23 38.52 10.94 
Education (years)
a
 8.84 3.78 8.41 3.95 
Per Capita monthly expenditures (1,000 
Rwandan francs)
b
  
30.62 61.97 21.15 43.68 
Number of children (age < 18) in household
c
 2.99 2.15 3.02 1.95 
Number of elderly (age ≥ 50) in householdc 0.30 0.60 0.35 0.64 
Member of savings group (tontine) 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 
Member of insurance group 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
Have used formal credit 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.48 
Have used informal credit 0.48 0.50 0.55 0.50 
     
Number of Observations 623  181  
a
 There are 14 missing observations on education, so this is based on n=609 for the whole population, 
n=178 for the sequential-choice subjects. 
b
 Household per-capita monthly expenses in Rwandan Francs divided by 1000, range was 0 to 1007. 
c
 Ages were missing for some household members for some households, so these numbers are based on 
n=619 for the whole population, n=180 for the sequential-choice subjects. 
 
Who tends to make mistakes?  We regress the estimated probability of having 
made at least one mistake (from the error rate model) in the gain and gain-loss lotteries 
on demographic variables, as shown in Table 18.
20
   Because we found no difference in 
choices between real and hypothetical treatments for low stakes, those treatments are 
pooled together.  (If a dummy variable for the real payment treatment is included, it is not 
significant, and the results do not change.)  As expected, subjects in the low-stakes 
treatment showed a greater tendency to make mistakes.  The only other significant result 
is that over gain-loss women are more likely than men to make mistakes. 
                                                     
20
 A Tobit regression yielded the same results. OLS results are reported for ease of interpretation.  Results 
are also generally similar if the dependent variable is an indicator of ―switching back‖ rather than the 
probability a mistake was made. 
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Table 18. Probability of At Least One Inconsistent Choice (OLS Regression) 
 Gain Gain-Loss 
Female 0.049 
(0.063) 
0.164** 
(0.071) 
Married -0.027 
(0.062) 
0.063 
(0.078) 
Age -0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Education (years)
a
 0.009 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Monthly expenses -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of children (age <18) 
in household 
0.001 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
Number of elderly (age ≥ 50) 
in household 
-0.049 
(0.044) 
0.021 
(0.057) 
Low stakes treatment 0.397*** 
(0.054) 
0.305*** 
(0.073) 
Constant 0.442*** 
(0.140) 
0.636*** 
(0.182) 
R
2
 0.261 0.184 
N 177 177 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard 
errors are used. All regressions include village-level fixed effects. 
a
 There were missing values on education for three observations, and missing household ages for another, 
so those observations are dropped. 
 
Next, we look at how risk aversion and tendency to make a mistake relate to 
financial decisions.  Before considering mistakes, we want to see if our proxy risk 
aversion measure alone can explain decisions.  Table 19 shows how membership in a 
savings group or insurance group and having taken either a formal or informal credit is 
affected by risk aversion, controlling for demographic covariates.
21
  For completeness, 
we look at both the sequential choice lottery and the five-pair lottery (which does not 
allow inconsistent choice).  To make these two sets of regressions comparable, we restrict 
the sample to the two survey locations where both types of lotteries were administered.  
(Assignment of lottery type to a subject within these sites was random.) 
                                                     
21
 Results are robust to alternative specifications, such as Logit and Dprobit. 
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Table 19. Financial Decisions without Inconsistency Measure (OLS Regressions) 
Five-Pair Lotteries 
 Savings Group Insurance Group Formal Credit Informal Credit 
Risk Aversion 
(gain) 
-0.025 
(0.114) 
 -0.111 
(0.132) 
 -0.067 
(0.144) 
 -0.286* 
(0.164) 
 
Risk Aversion 
(gain-loss) 
 0.111 
(0.101) 
 -0.071 
(0.123) 
 0.193 
(0.141) 
 -0.118 
(0.177) 
R
2
 0.033 0.046 0.058 0.053 0.303 0.319 0.088 0.058 
N 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
Sequential-Choice Lotteries 
 Savings Group Insurance Group Formal Credit Informal Credit 
Risk Aversion 
(gain) 
0.281 
(0.191) 
 0.189 
(0.182) 
 -0.347 
(0.216) 
 0.051 
(0.189) 
 
Risk Aversion 
(gain-loss) 
 0.111 
(0.154) 
 -0.056 
(0.163) 
 0.260 
(0.167) 
 -0.211 
(0.184) 
R
2
 0.180 0.157 0.191 0.179 0.193 0.182 0.093 0.106 
N 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard 
errors are used. All regressions include the control variables: gender, married, age, education, monthly per-
capita expenses, number of children (<18 yrs), adults age 50 and older, and village-level fixed effects. 
There were missing values on education or on the ages of household members for 5 observations (3 from 
the Sequential-Choice Lotteries and 2 from the Five-Pair Lotteries), so those observations are dropped. 
 
As the table shows, risk aversion is not significantly related to most financial 
instrument variables.  The only weakly significant relationship is between risk aversion 
over gains in the five-pair lotteries and taking out an informal loan.  Those who are more 
risk averse over gains are less likely to use an informal loan.  Gender also does not seem 
to have any explanatory power. 
Since risk aversion alone does not strongly correlate with using financial 
instrument use, we ask whether the tendency to make mistakes does.  A person who 
makes inconsistent choices over risk may fail to take optimal advantage of the financial 
instruments available to him, or he may be less trusted by informal lenders and savings 
and insurance groups.  On the other hand, if he is self-aware of his mistakes, he may 
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insure against this tendency and be more likely to select into these instruments. This is 
the argument made by Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006). 
Table 20 shows our results of OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard 
errors.
22, 23
  Being a member of a savings group or taking out an informal loan is 
significantly correlated with both risk aversion over gain-loss lotteries and tendency to 
make mistakes, but in opposite directions.  As described earlier, savings groups serve as a 
risk pooling device, so we would expect risk-averse individuals to be more likely to be a 
member.  They are.  Also, borrowing money from informal sources (usually family and 
friends) involves the risk of losing face should one fail to repay the loan.  These loans do 
not carry monetary interest, but they carry an expectation of reciprocation and default in 
this context can be socially costly.  Therefore, we would expect risk-averse individuals to 
be less likely to take out an informal loan.  They are. 
  
                                                     
22
 Because we use the estimated probability of making at least one mistake as an independent variable, we 
have a generated regressor.  We therefore do not use OLS standard errors. Instead, the estimates were done 
by sampling with replacement 10,000 times to generate estimates and bootstrapped standard errors.  The 
estimates are significant if they fall within the confidence interval specified in the table. 
23
 Results are somewhat similar if an indicator of egregious mistakes (B-to-A switches) is used instead of 
the estimated mistake probability, but the results for informal loans, though reflecting the same sign, are no 
longer significant.  This is not surprising, since the egregious mistake indicator understates true errors. 
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Table 20. Financial Decisions with Inconsistency Measures (OLS Regressions with 
Bootstrapped Errors) 
Gain Savings Group Insurance Group Formal Credit Informal Credit 
Risk Aversion 
 
0.664* 
(0.421) 
 -0.340 
(0.411) 
 -0.583 
(0.437) 
 0.150 
(0.478) 
 
Est Prob of 
Mistake 
0.465 
(0.283) 
 -0.305 
(0.273) 
 -0.108 
(0.312) 
 0.127 
(0.336) 
 
Risk aversion * 
Est Prob of 
Mistake 
-0.820 
(0.580) 
 1.014 
(0.599) 
 0.443 
(0.631) 
 -0.215 
(0.749) 
 
Gain-Loss Savings Group Insurance Group Formal Credit Informal Credit 
Risk Aversion 
 
 0.547*** 
(0.252) 
 0.096 
(0.247) 
 0.290 
(0.271) 
 -0.611*** 
(0.218) 
Est Prob of 
Mistake 
 0.515*** 
(0.239) 
 0.199 
(0.237) 
 0.081 
(0.270) 
 -0.606*** 
(0.219) 
Risk aversion * 
Est Prob of 
Mistake 
 -1.185*** 
(0.393) 
 -0.366 
(0.361) 
 0.020 
(0.443) 
 0.786*** 
(0.427) 
N 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. The estimates are bootstrapped 10,000 times. *coefficient falls 
between the [0.05, 0.95] percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter distribution, ** coefficient falls between 
the [0.025, 0.975] percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter distribution, *** coefficient falls between the 
[0.01, 0.99] percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter distribution. All regressions include the following 
control variables: gender, married, age, education, monthly per-capita expenses, number of children (<18 
yrs), adults age 50 and older, and village-level fixed effects. There were missing values on education or 
household member ages for 3 observations, so those observations are dropped. 
 
More importantly, risk aversion and tendency to make mistakes interact in 
meaningful and significant ways.  If we control only for tendency to make mistakes or 
risk and mistakes (not interacted), there is no significant effect.  That is, mistakes alone, 
risk alone, and risk and mistakes do not correlate with financial decisions.  It is the 
interaction of the two that is important.  Conditional on being more likely to make 
mistakes, a risk-averse individual is less likely to be in a savings group and more likely to 
take out an informal loan.  That is, those who make mistakes are less likely to choose as 
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we would expect.  These results suggest that individuals who make mistakes are not self 
aware, but rather do not choose optimally or are excluded from groups or informal loans. 
It is possible that the causation between our risk and mistake measures and the use 
of financial instruments runs in the opposite direction.  People who are in savings groups 
may know that they have a safety net and therefore feel comfortable acting in a riskier 
fashion; similarly, people who know they have outstanding obligations in their social 
network due to informal credit usage may feel less comfortable acting in a risky fashion.  
These correlations are opposite from what our results show.  However, it is conceivable 
that people who are in a savings group are less careful in the lab because they have a 
safety net (they make more errors) or that people who use informal credit are more 
careful because of their outstanding obligations (they make fewer errors).  This is not 
precisely an endogeneity problem, but simply a different possible explanation for the 
result we observe. 
Not all financial decisions are significantly correlated with risk aversion or 
mistakes.  Being a member of an insurance group and taking out a formal loan are not 
correlated with risk aversion, tendency to make mistakes, or the interaction.  This may be 
because insurance groups offer a variety of services, such as insurance, labor, and credit, 
so the correlation with risk and mistakes is obscured.  Formal loans from banks may be 
given under a specific set of criteria that are unrelated (or only weakly related) to risk 
aversion and the tendency to make mistakes. 
  
92 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Can we learn anything from mistakes?  This research suggests that we can.  Using 
a lottery experiment designed to detect inconsistent choice in risk, we examine the 
correlation between risk aversion, mistakes, and financial activities that may serve as 
safety nets.  We find that the tendency to make inconsistent choices over risk is 
widespread and women are more susceptible than men.  When mistakes are ignored, risk 
aversion alone does not explain the use of financial instruments.  When we control for the 
tendency to make inconsistent choices, however, risk and mistakes explain participation 
in savings groups and the use of informal credit.  As we would expect, risk-averse 
individuals are more likely to belong to a savings group and less likely to take out an 
informal loan.  Those who are more likely to make mistakes display the opposite 
behavior. Mistakes in the experiment are correlated with apparently suboptimal behavior 
in these financial decisions. 
The policy advice implied by these results are ambiguous, because it’s not clear 
whether financial choices are correlated with lab decisions because the financial choices 
are mistakes, because people are hedging against their own tendency to err, or because 
mistake-prone people are well-known in their communities and are therefore not offered 
credit.  Financial literacy education that encourages proper usage of financial instruments 
may be fruitful in any of these cases.  An interesting follow-up to this study would be to 
experimentally provide financial literacy education and see whether changes are observed 
later in either lottery choices or financial instrument take-up. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature.  First, our results may help 
explain the inconclusive results that relate lottery-measured risk aversion to economic 
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outcomes.  Like other researchers, we do not find a significant correlation between risk 
aversion and outcomes.  While some have suggested that the lack of correlation may be 
caused by a failure to properly control for background risk (Harrison, List, and Towe 
2007), our results suggest that it may also be due to not controlling for mistakes.  Second, 
our results show that tests for consistent behavior in lab experiments may yield results 
that help explain choices in non-experimental settings.  Previous work has mostly ignored 
inconsistent choices or designed experiments to not permit inconsistent behavior.  This 
research suggests that important behavioral information may be embedded in mistakes.  
Interactions of mistakes and preferences clearly have power to predict behavior.  
Therefore, lab experiments that intentionally reveal mistakes may be important tools for 
understanding important economic behaviors in credit markets, and may be useful in a 
variety of other settings as well. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the Girl Scout Cookie Experiment 
 
This Appendix contains the instructions provided to subjects in the Girl Scout 
Cookie experiment.  There are four components to the instructions:  the General 
Instructions, which are read at the start of the experiment; and then the specific 
instructions for each of three treatments.  Each treatment’s instructions starts with the 
text, ―Instructions for the [next] set of rounds.‖  In this Appendix, the name of the 
treatment is noted on the same line of text, although the treatment name was not included 
in the instructions the subjects saw.  Otherwise, except for details of pagination, these 
instructions are identical to those provided to the students. 
 
General Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment!  This is a study of decision-making behavior. It will 
last about two hours. 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters and the 
other participants, will ever know the decisions or earnings of anyone in the experiment. 
You will collect your earnings, in a sealed envelope, from a numbered mailbox that only 
you will have the key for. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your 
student ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions or your earnings. 
The only identifying mark that will be used is the identification number on the mailbox 
key that you will select.  Each key opens a mailbox in the hallway adjacent to this room. 
After the experiment, you will each collect your payment from your mailbox alone and 
privately. The key and mailbox are labeled with the same identification number. You are 
the only person who will know your identification number. 
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Random Group Assignments and Anonymity 
Each person will be randomly matched with 4 other people to form a 5-person 
group.  No one will learn the identity of the people in his/her group.  The composition of 
your group will change after a number of rounds, and you will be randomly matched in a 
new group of 5 people (you and 4 others).  You will be notified when the groups have 
been rearranged.  Once you are matched with a group, you will learn how many rounds 
you will play with this group.  In total, you will play in 3 different 5-person groups. 
Your Payment 
In each round of the experiment, you will make a decision.  What you earn in 
each round will depend on decisions that you and the other 4 people in your group make.  
Your payment for this experiment will be the sum of your earnings in all rounds. 
The Task 
For each decision, you will choose how to divide 20 tokens between two 
funds: the Personal Fund and the Group Fund.  You are free to contribute some of 
your tokens to the Personal Fund and some to the Group Fund.  Alternatively, you can 
contribute all of them to the Personal Fund, or all of them to the Group Fund.  You will 
earn money from the tokens you put in each fund (below we describe how).  Your total 
earnings for each round is the sum of your earnings from the Personal Fund plus your 
earnings from the Group Fund. 
1. The Personal Fund: each token you contribute to the Personal Fund will earn you 
$0.02. 
Example: Suppose you contribute 0 tokens to the Personal Fund.  Then you would earn 
nothing from the Personal Fund. 
Example: Suppose you contribute 10 tokens to the Personal Fund.  Then you would earn 
$0.20 from the Personal Fund. 
Example: Suppose you contribute 20 tokens to the Personal Fund.  Then you would earn 
$0.40 from the Personal Fund. 
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2. The Group Fund:  What you earn from the Group Fund will depend on the total 
number of tokens that you and the other 4 members of your group contribute to 
the Group Fund.  Every token any member of your group puts in the Group Fund 
earns money for each member of the group, but not everyone will earn the same 
amount of money. 
Before we explain more about the earnings from the Group Fund, you must learn 
about the Stakeholder.  In each round, one member of your group will be the 
Stakeholder.  This person earns more money (relative to the rest of the group) from all 
of the tokens in the Group Fund.  You will always know whether you are the Stakeholder.  
If you are not the Stakeholder, you earn $0.01 for each token any member of your 
group puts in the Group Fund.  If you are the Stakeholder, you earn $0.03 for every 
token any member of your group puts in the Group Fund. 
Example: Suppose you contribute 0 tokens to the Group Fund and no one else contributes 
any tokens to the Group Fund.  Then you would earn nothing from the Group Fund.  
Everyone else in your group would also earn nothing from the Group Fund. 
Example: Suppose you contribute 13 tokens to the Group Fund and no one else 
contributes any tokens to the Group Fund.  Suppose that you are the Stakeholder.  Then 
you would earn $0.39 from the Group Fund.  Everyone else in your group would earn 
$0.13 each from the Group Fund. 
Example: Suppose you contribute 20 tokens to the Group Fund and no one else 
contributes any tokens to the Group Fund.  Suppose that you are not the Stakeholder.  
Then you would earn $0.20 from the Group Fund.  The Stakeholder would earn $0.60 
from the Group Fund.  All of the other members of your group would earn $0.20 each 
from the Group Fund. 
Everyone will earn money from every token contributed to the Group Fund, 
whether they contribute tokens to the Group Fund or not. 
Decision Panel 
For each decision, you will enter your Group Fund contribution in the Decision 
Panel.  The Decision Panel is a box at the bottom of the screen that looks like the 
following: 
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Type the amount you want to put in the Group Fund in the box.  This must be a 
number between 0 and 20.  The amount that will go into your Personal Fund is 20 minus 
the amount you type.  For example, if you type the number 0, 0 tokens will go into the 
Group Fund and 20 into the Personal Fund.  If you type 6, 6 tokens will go into the Group 
Fund and 14 into the Personal Fund.  If you type 13, 13 tokens will go into the Group 
Fund and 7 into the Personal Fund. 
When you are satisfied with the allocation of tokens you entered, you will click 
the ―SUBMIT‖ button to submit your allocation. 
Contributions Table 
The Contributions Table gives you information about what has happened in past 
rounds and what will happen in future rounds.  The table will show all of the rounds you 
will play with your current group, and will indicate when you will be the Stakeholder.  
Also, after everyone has made their decisions for a round, the table will tell you what the 
Group Fund contributions were in that round, and what your earnings were. 
The table will change slightly in different parts of the experiment.  Before each 
part starts, you will receive specific instructions and you will see what the table will look 
like. 
Each Round Has Two Steps 
In each Round, you will proceed through two screens, one after the other.  The 
first screen is the decision screen.  In the decision screen, you will make your decision 
and click the ―SUBMIT‖ button when you are done.  After everyone has clicked 
―SUBMIT‖, everyone will proceed to the review screen.   
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The review screen will look very much like the decision screen, but you will have 
no decision to make.  You will see information about the decisions that were made in that 
round and previous rounds, and you will learn how much money you earned in that 
round.  In the Decision Panel of the review screen, you will see exactly how your 
earnings for that round were calculated.  When you are done reviewing this information, 
you must click ―DONE‖ to continue.   
 
The information in the Contributions Table will stay in the table through all 
rounds you play with the group, in both the decision and review screens 
Questionnaire and Payment 
After you have finished all of your decisions, you will complete a brief 
questionnaire.  Then you will receive payment anonymously and privately, and the 
session will be over.  You will collect your payment with no one watching, and no one 
else will learn your earnings. 
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QUIZ 
Case 1:  Suppose out of your 20 tokens you contributed 5 tokens to the Personal Fund 
and 15 tokens to the Group Fund.   Suppose that the other 4 members of your group 
together contribute a total of 60 tokens to the Group Fund.  Returns for the two Funds 
are: 
Personal Fund: $0.02 per token to you 
Group Fund:  $0.03 per token to Stakeholder 
   $0.01 per token to non-Stakeholders 
 
a) How much do you earn from the Personal Fund? _________ 
b) How many tokens in total were contributed by your group to the Group Fund? 
_________ 
c) If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund? 
_________ 
d) If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do each of the other members of your 
group earn from the Group Fund? _________ 
e) If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________ 
f) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund? 
_________ 
g) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much does the group’s Stakeholder earn 
from the Group Fund? _________ 
h) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do each of the group’s other non-
Stakeholders earn from the Group Fund? _________ 
i) If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________ 
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Case 2:  Suppose out of your 20 tokens you contributed 20 tokens to the Personal Fund 
and 0 tokens to the Group Fund.   Suppose that the other 4 members of your group 
together contribute a total of 8 tokens to the Group Fund.  Returns for the two Funds are: 
Personal Fund: $0.02 per token to you 
Group Fund:  $0.03 per token to Stakeholder 
   $0.01 per token to non-Stakeholders 
 
 How much do you earn from the Personal Fund? _________ 
 How many tokens in total were contributed by your group to the Group Fund? 
_________ 
 If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund? 
_________ 
 If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do each of the other members of your 
group earn from the Group Fund? _________ 
 If you ARE the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________ 
 If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn from the Group Fund? 
_________ 
 If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much does the group’s Stakeholder earn 
from the Group Fund? _________ 
 If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do each of the group’s other non-
Stakeholders earn from the Group Fund? _________ 
 If you ARE NOT the Stakeholder, how much do you earn altogether? _________ 
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Instructions for the First Set of Rounds  (PUBLIC TREATMENT) 
 You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
 You will be with the same group for 10 rounds. 
 Each member of your group will be randomly assigned a new, different letter code 
that you will keep for these 10 rounds: A, B, C, D, or E. 
 The Stakeholder position will rotate through all 5 members of the group, in 
alphabetical order (A, then B, then C, etc.).  Each member of the group will be 
Stakeholder twice. 
 You will always know who is currently Stakeholder, when you are going to be 
Stakeholder, and when each other member of your group (identified by their letter 
code) will be Stakeholder, because the Stakeholder position will be marked in the 
Contributions Table and in the status bar. 
 In each round, you must decide how many of 20 tokens to put in the Personal 
Fund and how many in the Group Fund. 
 When you have made your decision (by typing how many tokens (0 to 20) you 
want to put in the Group Fund), you must click ―SUBMIT‖. 
 The Contributions Table will show, for each past round: 
 what each member (identified by letter code) has contributed to the Group 
Fund; that is, there will be a column in the table corresponding to each 
group member, and that member’s contributions for each round will be 
filled in after the round 
 the total number of tokens in the Group Fund 
 your earnings 
 You will be able to tell what each group member contributed in each round; they 
will also be able to tell what you contributed in each round. 
 The table will indicate in which rounds each person will be the Stakeholder by 
marking those rounds in each person’s column with red, underlined stars (*****). 
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 You will see which column corresponds to you because your column will say the 
word YOU above it.  Each person has YOU marked at the top of their own 
column. 
 Also at the top of each table, in each round, the word Stakeholder will appear in 
red above the column of the person who is the Stakeholder in this round. 
 After everyone has made their decisions for each round, you may examine the 
Contributions Table and the calculation of your earnings in the review screen.  
Click ―DONE‖ when you are ready to move on to the next round. 
When you are entering your contribution, the screen will look like this: 
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When you are reviewing your results, the screen will look like this: 
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Instructions for the Second Set of Rounds  (PRIVATE TREATMENT) 
 You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
 You will be with the same group for 10 rounds. 
 All 5 members of the group will be Stakeholder twice. 
 You will only know when YOU are the Stakeholder—you will not know which 
group member is the Stakeholder in any given round if it is not you. 
 In each round, you must decide how many of 20 tokens to put in the Personal 
Fund and how many in the Group Fund. 
 When you have made your decision (by typing how many tokens (0 to 20) you 
want to put in the Group Fund), you must click ―SUBMIT‖. 
 The Contributions Table will show, for each past round: 
  what you have contributed to the Group Fund 
 a list of the Group Fund contributions of the other members of your group; 
these contributions will be listed in a random order that is reshuffled for 
each round 
 the total number of tokens in the Group Fund 
 your earnings 
 No one will not be able to track any other individual group member’s 
contributions. 
 The table will indicate in which rounds you will be the Stakeholder by marking 
those rounds in your column with red, underlined stars (*****).  
 After everyone has made their decisions for each round, you may examine the 
Contributions Table and the calculation of your earnings in the review screen.  
Click ―DONE‖ when you are ready to move on to the next round. 
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When you are entering your contribution, the screen will look like this: 
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When you are reviewing your results, the screen will look like this: 
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Instructions for the Third Set of Rounds  (INELIGIBLE TREATMENT) 
 You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
 You will be with the same group for 8 rounds. 
 Each member of your group will be randomly assigned a new, different letter code 
that you will keep for these 8 rounds: A, B, C, D, or E. 
 The Stakeholder position will rotate through 4 of the 5 members of the group. 
 The one person in your group who will never be the Stakeholder is the Ineligible 
Person.  This person is randomly selected at the start of this set of rounds, and 
will be Ineligible (will never be the Stakeholder) for all 8 rounds.  The Ineligible 
Person is identified to all group members in the Contributions Table and in the 
text in the status bar.   
 The Stakeholder position rotates through the four eligible members of the group 
for all 8 rounds, in alphabetical order.  For example, if person C is randomly 
chosen as Ineligible, the first Stakeholder will be person A, the second will be B, 
the third will be D, etc.   
 Everyone who is not Ineligible will be Stakeholder twice. 
 You will always know who is currently Stakeholder, when you are going to be 
Stakeholder, and when each other member of your group (identified by their letter 
code) will be Stakeholder, because the Stakeholder position will be marked in the 
Contributions Table and in the status bar. 
 In each round, you must decide how many of 20 tokens to put in the Personal 
Fund and how many in the Group Fund. 
 When you have made your decision (by typing how many tokens (0 to 20) you 
want to put in the Group Fund), you must click ―SUBMIT‖. 
 The Contributions Table will show, for each past round: 
 what each member (identified by letter code) has contributed to the Group 
Fund; that is, there will be a column in the table corresponding to each 
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group member, and that member’s contributions for each round will be 
filled in after the round 
 the total number of tokens in the Group Fund 
 your earnings 
 You will be able to tell what each group member contributed in each round; they 
will also be able to tell what you contributed in each round. 
 The table will indicate in which rounds each person will be the Stakeholder by 
marking those rounds in each person’s column with red, underlined stars (*****). 
 You will see which column corresponds to you because your column will say the 
word YOU above it.  Each person has YOU marked at the top of their own 
column. 
 Also at the top of each table, in each round, the word Stakeholder will appear 
above the column of the person who is the Stakeholder in this round.  
 The word Ineligible will appear above the column of the Ineligible person.   
 After everyone has made their decisions for each round, you may examine the 
Contributions Table and the calculation of your earnings in the review screen.  
Click ―DONE‖ when you are ready to move on to the next round. 
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When you are entering your contribution, the screen will look like this: 
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When you are reviewing your results, the screen will look like this: 
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Appendix B: Parametric Tests of Reciprocity in the Girl Scout Cookie Experiment 
 
In this Appendix, we use regression techniques to identify reciprocal behavior 
resulting from direct reciprocity and strategic self-interest.  These results may be biased 
because of the endogeneity inherent in group dynamic behavior.  We take care to limit 
the influence of this bias, but it is, to some extent, unavoidable. 
We perform a panel regression for one treatment at a time, with fixed effects and 
errors clustered by group.  Non-Stakeholder contributions in each round git are regressed 
on characteristics of that round, including hikt (a summary of the current Stakeholder k’s 
past generosity toward subject i: here, the current Stakeholder’s cumulative average 
contributions when subject i was Stakeholder) and Xit (other variables): 
   it ikt it itg a bh CX  
If direct reciprocity or strategic self-interest is important, b (the coefficient on hikt) 
should be positive in both the Public and Ineligible treatments.  In the Private treatment, b 
should be zero, because in each round, no-one knows who the current Stakeholder is or 
what that person has done in the past.  Group-level conditional cooperation could bias 
this coefficient upward, so we counteract that bias by including a control for group 
generosity in Xit.  Our control for group generosity is the group’s cumulative average 
non-Stakeholder contribution in past rounds.  For each subject in each round, this 
measure excludes his own past contributions and those of the current Stakeholder.  In the 
Ineligible treatment, this group measure also excludes the Bachelor (although the same 
results obtain using a measure that includes the Bachelor, results available on request).   
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The panel regression also includes in Xit the current round number and an 
indicator for whether this subject has passed his last Stakeholder stint.  If the coefficient 
on the round number is negative, there is a secular drop-off in cooperation.  The 
coefficient on the post-last-Stakeholder stint dummy can be interpreted as the importance 
of strategic giving. If a subject gives strategically in the rounds before his last 
Stakeholder stint, there should be a discontinuity in contributions that should be reflected 
in a large, negative coefficient on this dummy. 
Results are shown in Table 21.  Directly reciprocal behavior is supported for the 
Public and Ineligible treatments.  The coefficient on the post-last-Stakeholder stint 
dummy in the Public and Ineligible treatments is insignificant.  This implies that strategic 
motives are not important.  The same results obtain in an AR1 specification (results 
available upon request), except that in the Private treatment the post-last-Stakeholder stint 
dummy is no longer significant. 
Table 21. Fixed Effects Panel Regression of Non-Stakeholder Contribution  (in Percent 
of Endowment) on Period-Level Covariates 
 Private Treatment Public Treatment Ineligible Treatment 
Stakeholder average 
past contributions to me 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
Group average 
contributions 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.27) 
Round number 0.03 
(0.65) 
-1.69 
(1.22) 
-2.86** 
(1.34) 
Post-last Stakeholder 
Stint? (dummy) 
-9.66** 
(3.86) 
-1.66 
(5.05) 
-4.85 
(5.40) 
Constant 22.15*** 
(7.48) 
34.65** 
(13.68) 
42.50** 
(16.18) 
Observations (rounds) 720 720 432 
Number of subjects 120 120 96 
F 4.50 13.37 31.47 
R
2
 (overall) 0.078 0.182 0.156 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors are clustered on groups; individual fixed effects  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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As in Chapter I, we can test for the importance of other-regarding preferences by 
restricting our attention to the rounds after a subject has passed his final Stakeholder stint.  
See results in Table 22.  Due to the reduced population size, particularly for the Ineligible 
treatment, test power is significantly reduced and the Stakeholder past contribution 
coefficient is not statistically significant for the Ineligible treatment.  However, the 
coefficient on Stakeholder past contribution is positive for the Public treatment.  This 
implies that reciprocal behavior is at least partly rooted in other-regarding preferences. 
 
Table 22. Fixed Effects Panel Regression of Non-Stakeholder Contribution (in Percent of 
Endowment) on Period-Level Covariates, Post-Last Stakeholder Stint 
 Private Treatment Public Treatment Ineligible Treatment 
Stakeholder average 
past contributions to me 
-0.19 
(0.11) 
0.21* 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.22) 
Group average 
contributions 
0.39 
(0.44) 
-0.09 
(0.32) 
0.30 
(0.60) 
Round number -4.12** 
(1.83) 
-5.90*** 
(1.96) 
-4.89 
(2.26) 
Constant 48.39** 
(22.93) 
76.14*** 
(25.80) 
42.89 
(25.08) 
Observations (rounds) 240 240 144 
Number of subjects 96 96 72 
F 2.03 3.70 1.78 
R
2
 (overall) 0.036 0.106 0.083 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors are clustered on groups; individual fixed effects  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Finally, we build error clustering by group and fixed effects into a test using 
aggregate statistics, since this should eliminate the bias of our panel analysis while 
checking for robustness to intra-class correlation.  We create two stacked observations 
per subject: one to represent the subject’s behavior in rounds in which the current 
Stakeholder was previously generous (using the 10 token, or 50%-of-endowment, 
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threshold) toward this subject, and one to represent his behavior in rounds when the 
Stakeholder was ungenerous toward this subject.  A ―nice dummy‖ differentiates between 
the two observations for each subject.  We perform a panel regression, with these two 
observations per subject, in which we regress contributions on the ―nice dummy.‖  The 
same results obtain if we use group dummies, individual random effects, and individual 
fixed effects.  In Table 23 we show results of the individual fixed effects regression 
without group dummies.  The ―nice‖ dummy is significant and positive for the Public and 
Ineligible treatments, but not for the Private treatment.  The result that reciprocal 
behavior continues after the last Stakeholder stint also persists in this specification 
(results available upon request). 
 
Table 23. Panel Stacked Regression of Average Contribution (in Percent of Endowment) 
on "Nice Dummy" 
 Private Treatment Public Treatment Ineligible Treatment 
―Nice dummy‖ -1.59 
(2.72) 
14.83*** 
(2.68) 
17.30*** 
(2.72) 
Constant 29.16*** 
(1.36) 
27.09*** 
(1.34) 
23.92*** 
(1.36) 
Subjects 82 95 75 
R
2
 (overall) -0.001 0.058 0.096 
F 0.34 30.54 40.37 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors clustered on groups; individual fixed effects 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix C: Predictions of Risk Preference Theories 
 
In this Appendix, we describe in detail why the choices we call mistakes or 
inconsistent choices over risk are, in fact, inconsistent with standard theories of 
preferences over risk. 
First, we note that the gain lotteries can be defined as follows.  Lottery pair i 
(where i = 1, …, 5) offers two options: 
Safe lottery = Lottery B = { x + (i – 1)b, p=1/2; x – (i – 1)a } 
Risky lottery = Lottery A = { x + ib, p=1/2; x – ia } 
Similarly, for the gain-loss lotteries, lottery pair i offers: 
Safe lottery = Lottery B = { x + (i – 1)b, p=1/2; 0 – (i – 1)a } 
Risky lottery = Lottery A = { x + ib, p=1/2; 0 – ia } 
For low stakes lotteries, x = 500 RWF, a = 100 RWF, b = 200 RWF, and for high 
stakes lotteries, x = 1250 RWF, a = 250 RWF, b = 400 RWF.  We will demonstrate the 
argument for gain lotteries; the same conditions hold for the gain-loss lotteries except as 
noted. 
 
Expected Value 
 
Proposition 1. An Expected Value maximizer will prefer Lottery Ai for all i > 0. 
Proof.  For every lottery pair i, Lottery A has a lower expected value than Lottery B: 
     
1
2
     iEV A x ib x ia  
This simplifies to: 
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   
2
 i
i
EV A x b a  
       
1
1 1
2
       iEV B x i b x i a  
This simplifies to: 
   
1
2

 i
i
EV B x b a  
Therefore, choices governed by Expected Value will be A for all i > 0.  Therefore, 
Expected Value only predicts the pattern AAAAA. 
 
Expected Utility 
 
Proposition 2. Assume that Expected Utility governs choices, and that the utility 
function is increasing and non-inflected in the range of the lotteries.  Then if Lottery B is 
chosen for some lottery pair i, Lottery A may not be chosen for any following lottery i+1. 
Proof.  Define a utility function u(x).  Then Expected Utility from a lottery is 
 i i
i
EU p u x , so for the lotteries in this experiment where each outcome has 
probability ½: 
        1 2 1 2
1
2
EU u x u x u x u x     
Therefore, the expected utilities from the two lotteries can be defined as: 
        iEU A u x ib u x ia  
       1 1     iEU B u x i b u x i a  
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If the function u(x) is convex or linear, then for all i, EU(Ai) > EU(Bi) (note that A 
always has a higher expected value).  In these cases, Lottery B will never be chosen, and 
therefore it would be impossible to switch from selecting B in pair i to A in pair i+1.  Therefore, 
it suffices to show only that such a switch is impossible for strictly concave utility functions. 
Figure 7 below demonstrates the prizes for lottery i and lottery (i+1) for a concave 
utility function over income.   
 
Figure 7: Concave Utility Functions over Lottery Prizes 
 
We define: 
    1 1    udiff u x ia u x i a  
    2 1    udiff u x i a u x ia  
    3 1    udiff u x ib u x i b  
    4 1    udiff u x i b u x ib  
A concave utility function gets flatter as wealth decreases, so for a concave utility 
function, udiff1 > udiff2 and udiff3 > udiff4. 
x-(i+1)a   x-ia   x-(i-1)a   x+(i-1)b   x+ib   x+(i+1)b 
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In lottery pair i, choosing B means that EU(Bi) ≥ EU(Ai):  
         1 1u x i b u x i a u x ib u x ia          
This simplifies to: 
         1 1u x i a u x ia u x ib u x i b          
In other words, udiff2 ≥ udiff3.  In lottery pair i+1, choosing A means:  
         1 1u x i b u x i a u x ib u x ia          
This simplifies to: 
         1 1u x ia u x i a u x i b u x ib          
In other words, udiff1 ≤ udiff4.  However, it cannot simultaneously be true that 
udiff1 ≤ udiff4 and udiff2 ≥ udiff3 if the utility function is strictly concave throughout the 
region.  This is because if it is strictly concave, then udiff1 > udiff2 and udiff3 > udiff4 and 
therefore udiff2 ≥ udiff3 implies udiff1 > udiff3 and therefore udiff1 > udiff4, which implies 
that lottery B must be chosen in pair i+1.  This is a contradiction.  
Thus for a utility function that is concave through this region, an expected utility 
maximizer must never switch from B to A in a subsequent lottery pair.  Therefore, 
Expected Utility Theory only predicts patterns that do not switch from B to A; namely, 
AAAAA, AAAAB, AAABB, AABBB, ABBBB, and BBBBB. 
 
Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
Proposition 3. Assume that Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, or Cumulative 
Prospect Theory governs choices, and that the value function is increasing, concave, and 
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non-inflected in the range of the lotteries.  Then if Lottery B is chosen for some lottery 
pair i, Lottery A may not be chosen for any following lottery i+1. 
Proof.  Rank Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory 
transform both payoffs as well as probabilities.   
Although Prospect Theory allows an inflection point at zero, and Cumulative 
Prospect Theory allows inflection point at somewhat arbitrary reference points, the 
assumption of no inflection points in the range of the lotteries excludes the possibility of 
a reference points in the range of our lotteries.  Note that this means that this Proposition 
cannot apply to Prospect Theory for the gain-loss lotteries. 
Although the probabilities for the high and low outcomes are both ½, we allow 
the transformed probabilities to differ.  We designate the transformed probabilities as 
constants k1 and k2.  For our lotteries, these theories predict choice in lottery pair i based 
on a function of the form: 
     / 1 2   RD CPT iU A k v x ia k v x ib  
       / 1 21 1     RD CPT iU B k v x i a k v x i b  
Analogous to the terminology in the Expected Utility demonstration, we define:  
    1 1vdiff v x ia v x i a      
    2 1vdiff v x i a v x ia      
    3 1vdiff v x ib v x i b      
    4 1vdiff v x i b v x ib      
In these theories, if a subject prefers lottery B to A in pair i: 
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         1 2 1 21 1k v x i a k v x i b k v x ia k v x ib          
This simplifies to: 
         1
2
1 1
k
v x i a v x ia v x ib v x i b
k
            
In other words, 1
2 3
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
 .  In pair i+1, choosing A means:  
         1 2 1 21 1k v x i a k v x i b k v x ia k v x ib          
This simplifies to: 
         1
2
1 1
k
v x ia v x i a v x i b v x ib
k
            
In other words, 1
1 4
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
 .   
If v is concave then vdiff1 > vdiff2 and vdiff3 > vdiff4.  Therefore, if 
1
2 3
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
 , then 1 1 3
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
  and therefore 1 1 4
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
 .  But that violates 
the assumption that lottery Ai+1 is preferred to Bi+1.  This is therefore a contradiction, and 
therefore given the assumptions imposed a person choosing according to Rank 
Dependent Theory, Prospect Theory, or Cumulative Prospect Theory must never choose 
lottery B in pair i and subsequently choose lottery A in pair i+1. 
Given these assumptions, these theories only predict patterns that do not switch 
from B to A: AAAAA, AAAAB, AAABB, AABBB, ABBBB, and BBBBB. 
Discussion.  Reference points create a particular challenge for Prospect Theory in the 
area of 0 (i.e. for the gain-loss lotteries) and for Cumulative Prospect Theory for both sets 
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of lotteries.  These reference points are inflection points, and given such an inflection 
point the prediction is indeterminate. 
Discussion. If the value function is convex, it is possible for probability weighting to 
explain switching from lottery B in pair i to lottery A in pair i+1.  If a value function is 
convex, then vdiff1 < vdiff2 < vdiff3 < vdiff4.  Recall that both probabilities are ½, but they 
are transformed to weights k1 and k2.  By logic like the above, if Bi is preferred to Ai, then 
1
2 3
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
 .  If Ai+1 is preferred to Bi+1, then 
1
1 4
2
k
vdiff vdiff
k
 .  These conditions 
can all be met if 3 1 4
2 2 1
vdiff k vdiff
vdiff k vdiff
  . 
 
Dual Theory 
 
Proposition 4. Assume that the Dual Theory, which transforms probabilities but not 
payoffs, governs choices.  Then if the subject strongly prefers A for some pair i, he must 
prefer A for all following pairs; similarly, if he strongly prefers B for some pair i, he must 
prefer B for all following pairs. 
Proof.  The dual theory does not transform payoffs but only transforms probabilities.  We 
again use k1 and k2 to denote the transformed ½ probabilities for the high and low prizes 
respectively.  Therefore, Dual Theory evaluations of the lotteries in pair i are: 
     1 2   DT iU A k x ia k x ib  
       1 21 1     DT iU B k x i a k x i b  
This simplifies to: 
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     1 2 2 1   DT iU A k k x i k b k a  
      1 2 2 11    DT iU B k k x i k b k a  
Therefore, a subject who chooses according to the Dual Theory will choose Ai if: 
        1 2 2 1 1 2 2 11k k x i k b k a k k x i k b k a         
This simplifies to: 
2 10 k b k a   
Since  this choice does not depend on i, it will either be true for all lottery pairs or 
for no lottery pairs.  That is, a Dual Theory optimizer will always choose AAAAA or 
BBBBB if he has strong preferences. 
Discussion.  If a Dual Theory optimizer is indifferent for one lottery pair in the set, he 
will be indifferent for all lottery pairs in the set.  True or ―practical‖ indifference could 
produce patterns other than those predicted here. 
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